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INTRODUCTION 
A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether a suit may be main-
tained as a class action. Variations on this phrase populate the class action 
jurisprudence of the federal courts. The sentiment reflects the equity roots 
of the representative class proceeding—a history that has been thoroughly 

† Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. As ever, my work has benefited 
from the generous input of brilliant colleagues. I owe much to Steve Burbank, Sam Issacharoff, 
Anthony Scirica, and David Shapiro. Equally important are the contributions of Sydney Scott, 
Penn Law Class of 2013, who undertook a daunting project with persistence and extraordinary skill 
and produced the initial research file upon which the body of this Article was constructed. 
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investigated by leading scholars in the field of civil procedure,1 structured 
the work of the committee that drafted modern Rule 23,2 and has repeatedly 
been embraced by the Supreme Court as a necessary starting point when 
interpreting and applying the Rule in modern practice.3 The power of the 
federal courts to exercise discretion when deciding whether to permit a suit 
to proceed as a class action has long been treated as an elemental component 
of a representative proceeding. It is therefore cause for surprise that there is 
no broad consensus regarding the nature and definition of this judicial 
discretion in the certification process. The federal courts have not coalesced 
around a clear or thorough exposition of the question, and the scholarly 
literature has not provided a sustained analytical treatment. 
Since the adoption of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, lower federal 
courts have regularly exercised discretion in a range of modes when presented 
with requests for class certification. The management of class proceedings is 
perhaps the most widely acknowledged form of this discretion. The authority 
of district courts to make judgments about how to structure a complex 
proceeding—and to decide whether practical obstacles to the fair and 
accurate adjudication of claims on a class-wide basis make certification 
inappropriate—is a familiar one that enjoys an explicit textual foundation in 
Rule 23(b)(3) proceedings.4 Similarly, district courts sometimes exercise 
discretion in defining the parameters of the class definition and deciding 
when subclasses are necessary, often acting independently of any proposals 
made by the parties. 5  And district courts—frequently acting with the 
imprimatur of the courts of appeals—have invoked a broad range of consid-
erations to decide when class certification is desirable, appropriate, or 

1 See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE 
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) (tracing the roots of the class action device); Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 
1858-61 (1998) (examining the device’s English antecedents). 
2 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375-80 (1967) (discussing the equity roots of the 
class action provision revised and expanded in the 1966 amendments). 
3 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832-41 (1999) (surveying the use of class actions 
in state equity courts predating the Rules Enabling Act); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (“Rule 23, governing federal-court class actions, stems from equity practice 
and gained its current shape in an innovative 1966 revision.”). 
4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (requiring that a district court consider “the likely difficul-
ties in managing a class action” in deciding whether to authorize certification of (b)(3) class 
actions). 
5 The authority to make judgments on such matters is also made clear in the Rule, though the 
textual basis for considering them sua sponte is more debatable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B) 
(requiring definition of the class for certification); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) (permitting the 
creation of subclasses). 
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consistent with the underlying substantive law that governs the disputes 
brought before them. In (b)(3) proceedings, these determinations are often 
explained as an application of the superiority requirement, and in (b)(2) 
actions they are sometimes described in terms of the prerequisites for 
injunctive relief. However, lower courts have also found these forms of 
discretion to be inherent in Rule 23, requiring judges to consider the impact 
of substantive law on the certification question without regard to any 
specific textual mandate.6 
Three propositions have infused this practice of discretionary class cer-
tification. The first is an understanding among judges that the modern class 
action entails an element of public trust. When a plaintiff comes into court 
asking to prosecute the claims of numerous people she has never met, she is 
not asserting a purely personal prerogative. Rather, the plaintiff is requesting 
that the court employ its authority to initiate a type of proceeding that must 
be justified with reference to broader public values: the procedural and 
systemic values embodied in Rule 23 itself, and the policies of the underlying 
law governing the dispute. Second, class actions entail substantial uncertainty. 
The question whether claims can be faithfully adjudicated and successfully 
managed on a classwide basis is often difficult to predict at the inception of 
a proceeding. And third, this combination of broad public interests and 
factual indeterminacy sometimes calls for experimentation as courts test the 
capacity of the class action to facilitate the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” 
resolution of mass claims.7 
Because of these realities, discretion in class certification—in particular, 
the discretion not to certify a class even though the threshold requirements 
of the Rule appear to be satisfied—serves a vital systemic role. Discretion is 
a safety valve. It enables district judges to avoid issuing certification orders 
that would undermine substantive policies or set in motion unnecessary and 
counterproductive remedies. In the absence of this tool, lower federal courts 
are left only with a blunt instrument to avoid adverse results in difficult 
cases: categorical limitations on the threshold conditions of certification, 
which threaten to constrain class litigation in all types of disputes. At the 
same time, the discretionary power to decline certification raises legitimate 
questions about fairness, consistency of application, and the danger that 
courts will make inappropriate legislative judgments. The courts of appeals 
have addressed these concerns in a range of cases over the last five decades, 
and more attention to the limits of these discretionary powers is needed. 

6 See, e.g., Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 643 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting a 
district court’s “inherent power to manage and control its own pending litigation”). 
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.8 makes the need for a systematic examina-
tion of these matters more salient. In one of the few passages that garnered 
a majority of an otherwise fractured opinion, the Court used language that 
could be read to deprive district courts of any discretion when deciding 
whether certification is appropriate in a given case9—a holding that would 
upend forty-five years of practice under modern Rule 23. Using language to 
describe Rule 23(b) that I have found in no other reported decision, the 
majority explained that “[t]he discretion suggested by Rule 23’s ‘may’ is 
discretion residing in the plaintiff [and not the district court]: He may bring 
his claim in a class action if he wishes.”10 The Court did not indicate that it 
was effecting any radical change, nor did it acknowledge any need to 
harmonize its assertion with the decades of federal judicial holdings recog-
nizing the discretion of district courts in matters related to certification, 
including multiple statements by the Court itself.11 Rather, the majority 
spoke in a register that suggested it did not believe it was saying anything 
surprising. 
To paraphrase Professor David Shapiro, in a society where revolution is 
not the order of the day, it would disserve the drafters of the Federal Rules 
to impute a revolutionary purpose to unremarkable language.12 A ruling that 
lower federal courts lack discretion in deciding whether a suit should be 
certified for class treatment would be revolutionary, and a careful examina-
tion of the majority’s discussion of Rule 23 in Shady Grove makes clear that 
the ruling calls for no such revolution. 
This Article undertakes three tasks. Part I examines the abuse of discre-
tion standard in class certification and its place in broader academic and 
judicial discussions about the nature of procedural discretion. Part II then 
sets forth a descriptive account of the discretion that federal courts have 
understood themselves to possess in class certification proceedings under 
modern Rule 23, and it attempts to develop a useful taxonomy in describing 
the different modes in which that discretion has operated. My focus is legal 
doctrine as manifested in reported judicial decisions, an incomplete source 

8 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
9 Id. at 1437-38. 
10 Id. at 1438. 
11 See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 703 (1979) (“The certification of a nationwide 
class, like most issues arising under Rule 23, is committed in the first instance to the discretion of 
the district court.”). 
12 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
921, 941-42 (1992) (discussing judicial resistance to change imposed by the plain language of 
statutes). 
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for discerning the actual practice of trial courts, but still indispensable in 
assessing the parameters within which that practice has unfolded. This 
overview is the product of close analysis of approximately one hundred class 
action rulings that discuss the nature of discretion in class certification, 
drawn, in turn, from the review of a larger universe of cases assembled with 
the help of an invaluable research assistant. I make no claim that the results 
are comprehensive, but I believe that they make possible a representative 
account of the range and types of discretion that lower federal courts have 
understood themselves to possess when considering certification requests.  
With this body of material set forth for discussion, Part III provides an 
argument about the systemic function of discretion in class certification and 
the institutional implications of different species of discretion in the 
certification process. Part III also reexamines the Shady Grove decision in 
light of the preceding discussion, asking how much past practice in class 
adjudication the ruling unsettles. The answer to that question is: not much. 
Shady Grove can be harmonized with the large body of discretionary practice 
undertaken by lower federal courts in class certification proceedings, and 
there is reason to hope that this harmonization will prompt more active 
attention to the nature and boundaries of lower court discretion in class 
action litigation going forward. 
I. THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD IN CLASS CERTIFICATION 
The classic discussion of procedural discretion and appellate review in 
the academic literature comes from Judge Henry Friendly’s canonical 
lecture Indiscretion About Discretion.13 Throughout that essay, Judge Friendly 
emphasizes the need to distinguish between respective areas of competence 
and systemic concerns when defining the relationship between trial courts 
and appellate courts in discretionary matters.14 Determinations that benefit 
from “the trial court’s superior opportunities to reach a correct result” 
through direct contact with parties, witnesses, and events are more appro-
priate recipients of wide discretionary berth, as are those situations that 
require a balancing of factors “so numerous, variable and subtle that the 
fashioning of rigid rules would be more likely to impair [the trial judge’s] 
ability to deal fairly with a particular problem than to lead to a just result.”15 

13 Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982). Judge Friendly 
drew upon Professor Rosenberg’s important treatment of the issue in Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial 
Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 (1971). 
14 See generally Friendly, supra note 13. 
15 Id. at 760 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. McCoy, 517 F.2d 41, 44 (7th Cir. 
1975) (Stevens, J.)). 
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On the other end of his spectrum, Judge Friendly places those cases in 
which “Congress has declared a national policy and enlisted the aid of the 
courts’ equity powers in its enforcement”—circumstances where “the need 
for uniformity and predictability demand thorough appellate review.”16 This 
analytical framework, placing matters that largely concern factual determi-
nations in opposition to matters involving substantive legal policy, is now 
regularly incorporated into discussions about judicial discretion. The 
distinction tracks and expands upon the terms “primary discretion” and 
“secondary discretion” that Professor Rosenberg had earlier introduced into 
the literature and that are still in use.17 
It is worth noting how Judge Friendly uses this analytical framework in 
his published lecture. The Judge saw courts exhibiting a lack of appreciation 
for the substantive policy implications of their procedural rulings. But this 
did not lead him to conclude that the ability of courts to exercise judgment 
should be reduced by more strictly defined legislative rules. Rather, Judge 
Friendly emphasizes the distinction, often lost, between the overall role of 
discretion in a judicial system and the prerogative of trial courts, as opposed 
to appellate courts, in exercising that discretion: 
A good deal of confusion has been generated by failure to distinguish 
between two uses of the word “discretion.” The one with which I primarily 
concern myself today, namely how far an appellate court is bound to sustain 
rulings of the trial judge which it disapproves but does not consider to be 
outside the ball park—a question of the allocation of an admitted power 
within the judicial system—is quite different from the question whether, as 
a normative matter, it is wise for lawmakers to insist on rigid rules in the 
interest of certainty, no matter how harshly these may operate in some cases, 
and whether it is not better to prescribe accordion-like standards that afford 
the courts some dispensing powers to accomplish what they perceive to be 
justice. To say the latter does not necessarily entail that such discretionary 
power should be vested predominantly in the trial court rather than in the 
entire judicial system.18 
Indiscretion About Discretion urges an analytical shift toward appellate 
constraints in the administration of those flexible standards that have 
substantive policy implications. In Judge Friendly’s view, “broad judicial 

16 Id. at 783-84. 
17 See Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 637 (defining “primary discretion” as the power of courts to 
make judgments free from “decision-constraining rules,” and “secondary discretion” as a limitation 
on the error-correcting function of lower courts in a multilevel court system). 
18 Friendly, supra note 13, at 754-55. 
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review is necessary” in such cases “to preserve the most basic principle of 
jurisprudence” that “we must act alike in all cases of like nature.”19 
A year following the publication of his lecture, with his thoughts in this 
area presumably sharpened by the exercise, Judge Friendly had the oppor-
tunity to write his views into law. In Abrams v. Interco Inc., Judge Friendly 
penned an opinion agreeing with a district court that problems of notice and 
manageability made a nationwide class inappropriate.20 Though affirming 
the denial of certification, the Judge took the occasion to discount the 
relevance of the abuse of discretion standard to questions of class certification: 
Abuse of discretion can be found far more readily on appeals from the denial 
or grant of class action status than where the issue is, for example, the 
curtailment of cross-examination or the grant or denial of a continu-
ance. . . . While no two cases will be exactly alike, a court of appeals can 
no more tolerate divergence by a district judge from the principles it has 
developed on this subject than it would under a standard of full review—
and this even though the district judge has adduced what would be plausible 
grounds for his ruling if the issue were arising for the first time. Except to 
the extent that the ruling is based on determinations of fact . . . or where 
the trial judge’s experience in the instant case or in similar cases has given 
him a degree of knowledge superior to that of appellate judges, as often 
occurs, review of class action determinations for “abuse of discretion” 
[would] not differ greatly from review for error.21 
Judge Friendly’s formulation continues to shape the case law in the Second 
Circuit, though in a strangely altered form: that circuit now maintains that 
appellate courts are “noticeably less deferential when the district court has 
denied class status than when it has certified a class.”22 Why an appellate 
court should show greater deference in its review of an order granting 

19 Id. at 758. 
20 719 F.2d 23, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1983). 
21 Id. at 28. 
22 Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003) (alterations omitted); see 
also Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Parker, 331 
F.3d at 18) (“When reviewing a denial of class certification, we accord the district court noticeably 
less deference than when we review a grant of certification.”), overruled on other grounds by 
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2008). 
The Vermont Supreme Court has politely disassociated itself from this unbalanced formulation of 
the standard. See Salatino v. Chase, 939 A.2d 482, 485 (Vt. 2007) (“We . . . decline to construe 
Vermont Rule 23 as the Second Circuit construed the analogous federal rule . . . .”). 
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certification than in its review of an order denying certification is not 
apparent.23 
Other federal courts of appeals have exhibited a range of approaches 
when defining the procedural discretion that district courts enjoy in the 
class certification process. The practice of giving deference on the highly 
fact-bound components of the certification analysis is widespread and 
apparently uncontroversial, as Judge Friendly argued it should be. For 
example, in a 1976 ruling, Hornreich v. Plant Industries, Inc., the Ninth 
Circuit upheld a district court’s denial of certification in a shareholder 
derivative suit on adequacy of representation grounds.24 Explaining that 
“[d]etermination of right to bring a class action . . . is in the considered 
discretion of the trial court,” the Ninth Circuit observed that “the evidence 
is not wholly undisputed” and “there is a possibility that some of the facts 
[regarding adequacy] might not in themselves prevent a derivative suit.”25 
Nonetheless, the court held that, “when considered in totality, we cannot 
say that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s claim 
to proceed.”26 Nearly thirty-five years later, the Eighth Circuit employed a 
similar standard in Rattray v. Woodbury County, upholding a district court’s 
finding that a plaintiff ’s significant delay in seeking class certification had 
revealed the plaintiff and her lawyers to be inadequate class representatives.27 
“Having worked with counsel for more than a year in this case,” the court 
explained, “the district court has a better vantage point from which to 
determine whether the delay in moving for certification suggests that 
[plaintiff ’s] counsel would not effectively pursue the interests of absent class 

23 The proposition appears to trace back to Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993). 
Robidoux mistakenly cites Abrams as already imposing this distinction between review of orders 
granting certification and review of orders denying certification, and it offers no further analysis 
for why this distinction is appropriate or desirable. Id. at 935. There is no basis for such a pro-
certification distinction in the text of Rule 23 itself, and any argument that the underlying law in a 
given case strongly favors certification would have to operate on a substance-specific rather than a 
trans-substantive basis. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1067 (2013) (discussing the potential role of the underlying substantive 
law in shaping the actions of a court in complex litigation). 
Robidoux also carries forward Judge Friendly’s observation that nondeferential review of class 
certification is warranted where appellate courts “have built a body of case law with respect to class 
action status.” 987 F.2d at 935. That is a defensible approach to appellate review of certification 
decisions (though not the only one, as the cases in this Part demonstrate), but it offers no support 
for a distinction between appellate review of certification grants and review of certification denials, 
as the Robidoux court seemed to believe. 
24 535 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1976). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 614 F.3d 831, 836-37 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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members.”28 Appellate courts have shown similar deference to district courts 
on questions of manageability, provided that the trial judge’s ruling is 
undergirded by a careful examination of the issue,29 and on questions of 
commonality and predominance when the necessary judgments involve a 
close examination of ambiguous facts.30 
Appellate courts have also given deference on certification questions that 
implicate broader issues of procedural or legislative policy—the types of 
cases for which Judge Friendly argued that trial courts should have circum-
scribed authority. In one recent ruling, Shook v. Board of County Commissioners 
of El Paso,31 the Tenth Circuit embraced this species of deference in unusually 
explicit terms. The case involved a 23(b)(2) action for injunctive relief filed 
on behalf of mentally ill inmates in a Colorado county jail who alleged 
unconstitutional confinement conditions and inadequate care.32 The trial 
judge refused to certify, finding that the breadth with which the plaintiffs 
had defined the class presented difficulties in crafting a standard of care 
applicable to all class members and introduced too many questions that 
would depend upon members’ individual circumstances.33 The appellate 
court found these to be acceptable grounds for the district court’s denial of 
class certification, despite substantial room for disagreement about its 
conclusions. In affirming the denial of class certification, the Tenth Circuit 
explicitly reserved the possibility that another district court might come to a 
different conclusion in a future case, stating“[w]hile we very well may have 
made a different decision had the issue been presented to us as an initial 
matter, and while other district courts perhaps could have chosen, or could 
choose, to certify similar classes, we cannot say that the district court’s 
assessment was beyond the pale.”34 In reviewing the obstacles to certification 

28 Id. at 836; see also De Leon-Granados v. Eller & Sons Trees, Inc., 497 F.3d 1214, 1220-21 
(11th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s certification and deferring to its decision to delay 
resolving a dispute about the adequacy of the named representatives until a fuller factual record 
was developed). 
29 See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 998, 1011 (3d Cir. 1986) (expressing “mis-
givings” about the manageability of a nationwide asbestos abatement suit, but affirming class 
certification because “[m]anageability is a practical problem, one with which a district court 
generally has a greater degree of expertise and familiarity than does an appellate court”). 
30 See, e.g., Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 640-41 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming a district court’s 
denial of certification in a securities action, despite some errors of law in framing questions under 
Rule 23(a), because “the district court is in the best position to determine whether the complaints 
of investors who rely on different corporate statements are sufficiently similar to warrant class 
certification”). 
31 543 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 2008). 
32 Id. at 600-01. 
33 Id. at 602-03. 
34 Id. at 603-04. 
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that the trial judge identified, the court acknowledged that “the sorts of 
problems highlighted by the district court may have been mitigated, or 
perhaps avoided, by the use of subclasses,”35 but the Supreme Court has 
placed the onus of proposing subclasses on the party seeking certification,36 
and the Shook court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to consider the issue sua sponte.37 An appellate court’s role, the 
Tenth Circuit found, is to ask “whether the district court’s decision ‘exceeded 
the bounds of permissible choice,’ a standard that . . . acknowledges the 
possibility that polar opposite decisions may both fall within the ‘range of 
possible outcomes the facts and law at issue can fairly support.’”38 
Shook’s statement of appellate deference to trial court discretion is one of 
the broadest I have discovered in a case where certification turns on ques-
tions of underlying substantive policy rather than on factual disputes or 
management problems. But it does not stand alone. Many circuits have 
found that broad policy considerations call for discretion in the certification 
decision, often through the mechanism of the superiority requirement, and 
they have concluded that appellate courts should review such discretion 
deferentially. 
Several such rulings may be found in cases arising under the federal 
Truth in Lending Act (TILA), a statute that played a significant role in 
early interpretations of the 1966 version of Rule 23. Under the original 
version of the Act enacted in 1968, creditors were subject to statutory 
damages for each instance in which they failed to disclose specified infor-
mation “to any person”39—a provision that opened the door to crushing 
aggregate liability in some cases. When the dangers of the TILA became 
apparent, Congress amended the statute to set a $500,000 cap on total 
recovery in class action proceedings and to give courts leeway to determine 
appropriate total damages, taking into account “among other relevant 

35 Id. at 606. 
36 See id. at 607 (citing U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 408 (1980)). 
37 See id. (“While the district court could have sua sponte suggested subclassing as a possible 
solution to Rule 23(b)(2) problems, the Supreme Court has indicated that courts do not bear any 
obligation to do so . . . .”). As other courts have pointed out, Geraghty affirmed the portion of the 
Third Circuit ruling that required the district court on remand to consider the issue of subclasses. 
See, e.g., Fink v. Nat’l Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“While the court need 
not take initiative, Geraghty holds, it must weigh the possibility of subclasses or of certifying a 
narrower class.”). “[T]he burden of constructing subclasses”—that is, determining what specific 
subclasses might resolve potential obstacles to certification—falls exclusively on the parties. 
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 408. 
38 Shook, 543 F.3d at 610 (quoting United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1053 (10th Cir. 
2007)). 
39 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1968), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976). 
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factors, the amount of any actual damages awarded, the frequency and 
persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, the resources of the 
creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which 
the creditor’s failure of compliance was intentional.”40 Under these amendments, 
Congress placed its imprimatur upon the use of the class action to enforce 
the TILA, but it invited courts to use their judgment in determining appro-
priate damages and, by implication, whether class treatment was appropriate 
at all. Congress, in other words, had “declared a national policy and enlisted 
the aid of the courts’ equity powers in its enforcement”—the sort of circum-
stance that Judge Friendly believed called for “uniformity and predictability” 
by way of “thorough appellate review.”41 
But several circuits followed a different path, treating district court cer-
tification rulings in TILA cases with deference and exhibiting tolerance for 
a lack of strict uniformity. Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc.42 is one such 
case. In Watkins, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the decision of a district court 
to deny certification of a class comprising about one thousand customers of 
a small Michigan retailer who claimed TILA violations in the wording of a 
retail credit sales contract.43 The district court found these violations to be 
only technical in nature, emphasized that customers had suffered no actual 
damages, and noted that the company had quickly remedied the error after 
the violation was called to its attention.44 In light of these facts, the trial 
judge concluded that “maintenance of the class action . . . [was] an 
unnecessary overreaction to the violation here” and hence not a superior 
method of granting relief under Rule 23(b)(3).45 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
but only because of the deference it believed was due to the district court. 
“[T]he technical nature of the violations may well argue in favor of the 
appropriateness of the class action here,” the court explained, as class 
certification might be necessary to call violations to the attention of con-
sumers who would otherwise never learn of them.46 Characterizing these 
arguments as “persuasive,” the court said that “[w]ere the certification issue 
before us de novo we may very well have certified the class.”47 Reversing the 
district court’s decision, however, would “as a practical matter” constitute a 
holding that certification is required in all cases, “effectively negat[ing] the 

40 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976). 
41 Friendly, supra note 13, at 783-84. 
42 618 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1980). 
43 Id. at 398-99. 
44 Id. at 403. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 403-04. 
47 Id. at 404. 
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discretion of a district court to certify a class.”48 The court therefore affirmed, 
reiterating the general proposition that TILA class actions are “desirable and 
should be encouraged” and holding that “class certification should be denied 
only in a case involving technical violations and only where the district 
court, in the exercise of discretion, believes that certification is unwarranted.”49  
Despite setting forth a broad statement about legislative policy, the 
Sixth Circuit preserved a role for district courts to exercise discretion in 
determining when the purposes of the TILA would be furthered by class 
certification in a given case. Other circuits followed the Sixth Circuit’s lead 
on this point,50 and, in some cases, TILA rulings on appellate deference 
were translated to disputes involving other substantive legal regimes.51 
Of course, appellate courts have also reviewed certification decisions 
more aggressively in cases implicating substantive law questions or broad 
disputes over aggregation policy. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, a 
number of circuits adopted strong presumptions in favor of class treatment 
in civil rights cases, and they exercised invasive review when district courts 
denied certification in circumstances that undermined that substantive 
commitment.52 The courts of appeals have also articulated strong aggrega-
tion policies in some commercial areas and shown little deference when 
district courts have failed to enforce those policies. Thus in Kirkpatrick v. 
J.C. Bradford & Co., the Eleventh Circuit reversed the order of a district 
court denying class certification on predominance and adequacy grounds in 
a securities action in which the plaintiffs claimed that a brokerage house had 

48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See, e.g., Shroder v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 729 F.2d 1371, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1984) (affirm-
ing the district court’s denial of certification in a case involving approximately five hundred home 
purchasers given documents by a title company alleged to contain TILA violations and giving the 
district court discretion to determine when a class action is a “superior” remedy in cases involving 
technical TILA violations). 
51 For example, the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Shroder played a role in another Elev-
enth Circuit case, Hines v. Widnall, involving alleged violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. 334 F.3d 1253, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a denial of 
certification based on a lack of typicality, emphasizing that “whether, in reviewing the record de 
novo, we would certify the class is of no consequence” and that the district court’s conclusions 
about typicality were “within the range of permissible choice and thus not a clear error of 
judgment.” Id. at 1257. 
52 See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 1982) (ar-
ticulating a strong presumption “in favor of making [the class procedure] available to litigants 
when possible” in a student civil rights case); Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364, 1378 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(insisting that Rule 23(b)(2) “must be read liberally in the context of civil rights suits,” and that 
“[t]his principle of construction limits the district court’s discretion”). 
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circulated misleading information concerning an oil and gas fund that later 
collapsed.53  
The appellate court began by reversing the district court on a merits 
question, finding that plaintiffs were entitled to pursue a fraud-on-the-market 
theory based on a common course of misleading statements issued by the 
fund and its agents.54 Rather than remanding for reconsideration of the 
predominance analysis in light of this revised standard, the appellate court 
found that “[i]n view of the overwhelming number of common factual and 
legal issues presented by plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims . . . the mere 
presence of the factual issue of individual reliance could not render the 
claims unsuitable for class treatment.”55 The Eleventh Circuit determined 
that it was appropriate to set a uniform policy on aggregation where the 
complaint “alleges a single conspiracy and fraudulent scheme against a large 
number of individuals” and it constrained the discretion of trial courts to 
deny certification in such cases.56 The court also found that the district 
court had applied an erroneous standard in assessing the adequacy of the 
named plaintiffs to represent the class.57 Here, in contrast, it did remand for 
a new determination by the district court after correcting the adequacy 
standard, explaining that “[i]n contrast to the more strictly legal questions 
presented by the [fraud-on-the-market and predominance issues], the 
adequacy of class representation is primarily a factual issue that is best left 
for determination by the district court.”58 
Finally, Antonin Scalia had an opportunity to speak about the relationship 
between trial and appellate courts in matters relating to discretion and class 
certification in a dispute that he heard while a judge on the D.C. Circuit. 
The views he expressed in that case are an important point of reference in 
assessing the decision he later authored in Shady Grove, as Part III explains. 
In Fink v. National Savings & Trust Co., the D.C. Circuit, per Judge Abner 
Mikva, reversed several rulings of a district judge in an ERISA dispute.59 
On the question of class certification, Judge Mikva wrote that the trial court 
had abused its discretion when it denied class certification on typicality and 

53 827 F.2d 718, 720-21, 728 (11th Cir. 1987). 
54 Id. at 722 (“We cannot agree, however, with the court’s rejection of the fraud-on-the-
market theory as a basis for class action treatment.”). 
55 Id. at 724-25. 
56 Id. at 725 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57 The district court required class representatives to “demonstrate . . . that individually 
they will pursue with vigor the legal claims of the class,” a prerequisite that the appellate court 
found did “not vindicate the policies and purposes of Rule 23” nor the substantive interests of the 
underlying regulatory scheme. Id. at 727. 
58 Id. at 728. 
59 772 F.2d 951, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
  
1910 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1897 
 
adequacy grounds without conducting any hearings or making any findings, 
despite the presence of substantial and contested factual issues, leaving the 
appellate court with no meaningful basis to conduct its review.60 Judge 
Scalia strenuously objected, arguing that this form of appellate review 
intruded inappropriately upon the district court’s discretionary control over 
class certification.61 Reminding the majority “that the District Court has 
broad discretion in determining whether a suit should proceed as a class 
action,” Judge Scalia offered a different view of the factual record.62 Certain 
“undisputed facts” suggested the possibility of defenses peculiar to the 
named representatives and imperfectly aligned interests within the class, he 
explained, and these potential obstacles to certification were “more than 
enough to prevent our finding the District Court’s refusal to certify [on 
typicality and adequacy grounds] an abuse of discretion.”63 The fact that the 
trial court had not identified these potential obstacles to certification as the 
basis of its holding did not change the analysis, in Judge Scalia’s view.64 It 
was enough that the trial court would have been acting within the permissi-
ble bounds of its discretion had it relied upon these features of the suit to 
deny certification.65 Reversing under those conditions, Judge Scalia said, 
“represent[ed] . . . a deep encroachment upon the domain of the District 
Court.”66 
As framed by Judge Scalia, the contested certification questions in Fink 
were rooted in core questions of substantive law and aggregation policy: 
whether the possibility that the named plaintiffs “might be subject to 
defenses of estoppel inapplicable to other class members” or “might have 
significantly different interests” from other class members would authorize a 
district court to exercise discretion in declining to certify, a decision that 
would in turn be insulated from invasive appellate scrutiny.67 His insistence 
upon the domain of the trial court in such matters places him solidly on the 
deferential end of the spectrum, contra Judge Friendly’s more appellate-
centered approach. As Part III explains, that statement of principle would 
be inconsistent with an excessively broad reading of Justice Scalia’s later 
opinion in Shady Grove. 

60 Id. at 960. 
61 Id. at 965 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
62 Id. at 964-65. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 965. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF DISCRETION UNDER MODERN RULE 23 
A. The Period of Transition Following the 1966 Revisions and 
Experimentation in the Face of Uncertainty 
In the years following the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, federal courts 
faced the task of implementing an entirely new type of procedural mecha-
nism and, in the case of Rule 23(b)(3), an entirely new type of proceeding. 
Of necessity, they engaged in experimentation, becoming acquainted with 
the operation of the new Rule and determining what types of representative 
suits would be possible under its provisions. In undertaking this effort, the 
lower federal courts were exercising a species of discretion, and some of 
them explicitly described their efforts in that language.  
For example, in one federal securities action, Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal 
Basic Industries, Inc., filed in 1968, Judge William Doyle of the District of 
Colorado had to decide whether a class action could proceed over claims of 
misrepresentation in the merger of two mineral and construction compa-
nies.68 The action carried the potential for “tremendous” damages,69 and 
although the court believed “the basic requisites for a class action [we]re 
satisfied,” it had questions about the merits of the fraud claim and concerns 
about the expense that plaintiffs would assume if the court were “to set all 
of the class action machinery in motion at [that] time.”70 The court thus 
decided that it would be “the better part of discretion” to defer notifying 
class members of the proceeding and begin with “a bifurcated trial on the 
threshold issues at least before proceeding further.”71 Only if the plaintiffs’ 
claims survived this initial test would they “notify the members of the class 
and go on from there.”72 The court was candid in saying that it was uncer-
tain about its experiment: “We are aware, of course, that the suggested 
approach is somewhat innovative, but the Rule 23 procedure itself is new 
and requires such efforts.”73 As another judge hearing a securities action in 
the Southern District of New York had explained a few years earlier, the 
newly revised Rule “added . . . some devices to aid in the management of ” 
class actions, and those tools could “provide[] the flexibility to permit [an] 
action to proceed” even where a lack of strict uniformity among claimants 

68 326 F. Supp. 98, 100-01 (D. Colo. 1971). 
69 Id. at 101. 
70 Id. at 105. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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“might have led to a dismissal of a class action under the old rule.”74 And, of 
course, the Supreme Court’s decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, which 
imposed some specific constraints on innovation by district courts, arose out 
of a trial judge’s extensive efforts to make sense of the appellate direction it 
was receiving in crafting an effective and practicable mechanism for recovery 
in a securities dispute.75 Lower federal courts hearing class actions in the 
years immediately following the 1966 amendments necessarily operated in 
an experimental mode. 
Experimentation, in turn, provided the practical and doctrinal 
knowledge from which the courts of appeals would sometimes craft more 
constraining rules. A ruling by the Second Circuit in a Rule 23(b)(3) 
securities class action, issued by a panel that included Judge Friendly, is 
illustrative. The case, Korn v. Franchard Corp., involved a prospectus issued 
by the general partners in a real estate venture.76 Shareholders in the 
venture alleged that the prospectus contained fraudulent and misleading 
statements. 77  The district court concluded that typicality, adequacy of 
representation, and predominance all made certification inappropriate for 
the issue of shareholder reliance on the prospectus.78 The court of appeals 
reversed, finding that “where, as here, there is a single written document 
charged with important omissions,”79 the case for certification is so strong 
that “a district judge could not decide against allowing a class action without 
abusing his discretion.”80  The court canvassed recent securities rulings 
presenting similar facts and the approaches those courts had taken to the 
reliance question, finding a strong presumption that “common questions 
predominate” in such cases.81  
We do not cite these formulations to tell the District Court that it should or 
must follow any of them. Our purpose is only to show that, though many 
paths have been taken, the federal courts have concurred in adopting pro-
cedures and rules which can reduce the difficulties of showing individual 

74 Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
75 417 U.S. 156, 161-69 (1974). 
76 456 F.2d 1206, 1207 (2d Cir. 1972). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1207-08. 
79 Id. at 1212. 
80 Id. at 1208. 
81 Id. at 1213. In a related study, Professor Issacharoff examined the development of the doc-
trine of reliance in consumer protection law and argued that “the amenability of certain claims to 
aggregate treatment turns on a clarification of the substantive standards for reliance,” concluding 
that the presence of a formal reliance requirement in the substantive law need not impede class 
certification in the typical case. Samuel Issacharoff, The Vexing Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class 
Actions, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1636 (2000). 
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reliance. . . . It may be, as some recent prophecies have it, that future 
history will pulverize the current hope of avoiding unduly cumbersome 
litigation on the reliance phase of these 10b-5 suits, but we are not yet sure 
enough of that speculation to insist, as a court applying existing Rule 23, that 
the present course must be sharply revised—at least not on the relatively 
simple facts of this case.82 
The court of appeals felt confident enough in the treatment of reliance that 
had emerged through experimentation in these other cases that it declined 
to remand the case after correcting the district court’s other errors, concluding 
that it was appropriate in this area of substantive law to impose a legal rule 
that left little room for trial-level discretion.83 
As the ensuing years made clear, discretion to experiment cannot 
amount to a suspension of the Rule’s requirements, nor can a trial court 
defer a robust certification inquiry in the name of experimentation. The 
1966 version of Rule 23(c)(1)(C) expressly invited district courts to make 
“conditional” determinations, and some courts relied upon that language to 
authorize class actions at an early stage of the proceedings without full 
confidence that an action was appropriate for class treatment.84 Even where 
this use of conditional certification reflected genuine diligence on the part 
of the trial court,85 rather than the kind of “certify now and worry later” 
approach that eventually came under heavy criticism,86 the practice had the 

82 Korn, 456 F.2d at 1213. 
83 Id. at 1208. 
84 See, e.g., Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (“Determinations of class 
action are only conditional and may always be altered or amended before a decision on the merits.” 
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1))); Ridgeway v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 134, 74 
F.R.D. 597, 601, 604 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (relying upon Rule 23(c)(1) to enter a “conditional order” of 
certification despite potential commonality problems, which could be “winnow[ed] out” at later 
stages of the proceeding). 
85 One prominent example of this is Judge William Schwarzer’s opinion in Harriss v. Pan 
American World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Judge William Schwarzer, a noted 
expert in the fields of procedure and judicial administration, invoked the language of former Rule 
23(c)(1)(C) to explain that conditional certification was “nothing more than a tentative determina-
tion for procedural purposes” that reserved to the court the opportunity to “determine whether 
any further proceedings directed to the issue of relief, if any, may be maintained as a class action” 
and address “such questions as subclassing, notice and intervention.” Id. at 47. 
86 The quoted language is from Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 
2000), a significant ruling that reined in certification practices by trial courts in Texas. For another 
example of an appellate ruling from the same era in which the court disapproved of the aggressive 
use of conditional certification, see Andrews v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 1014, 1019, 1025 (11th Cir. 1996), 
abrogated on other grounds by Douglas Asphault Co. v. QORE, Inc., 657 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2011), in 
which the Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court’s certification of a massive worldwide class 
action against telecom companies for their hosting of 900-number telemarketing programs alleged 
to constitute illegal gambling. In response to concerns about the management of the proceeding, 
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capacity to impose settlement pressure on defendants and undermine the 
interests of plaintiffs in a manner exceeding the legitimate scope of the 
Rule’s authority. The 2003 amendments to Rule 23 therefore eliminated all 
reference to conditional certification, with the Advisory Committee’s note 
emphasizing that “[a] court that is not satisfied that the requirements of 
Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been met.”87 
Experimentation in class certification, however, is not exclusively an 
artifact of the period following the 1966 amendments, nor need it indicate 
that district courts have shown a lack of diligence when resolving tough 
questions. Lower federal courts have found that discretion to experiment is 
sometimes necessary when they are presented with novel and intractable 
litigation challenges. A 1993 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit helps make this point. In Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. 
Grace & Co., an asbestos case arising from the abatement and property 
damage phase of that decades-long litigation, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a 
district court’s decision to certify a nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(3) of 
all public and private colleges and universities that owned buildings con-
taining friable asbestos, which federal law required them to remove.88 There 
were many liability issues common to the class, but also serious questions 
about predominance and manageability, coupled with a history of similar 
litigation in the Third Circuit in a nationwide damages action on behalf of 
public school districts that gave reason for skepticism.89 Having recounted 
that history, the Fourth Circuit noted that it reviewed the district court’s 

the district court insisted that it “can and will assemble the resources that [the proceeding] 
requires,” but the court of appeals found this assurance inadequate to meet threshold certification 
requirements and inappropriate insofar as it suggested certifying without regard to the impact 
upon judicial economy. Id. at 1025. 
87 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee’s note to the 2003 amendments. Prior to its 
amendment, Judge Marvin Frankel foresaw the potential for Rule 23(c)(1)(C) to cause mischief 
and treated the provision with caution, acknowledging that it “may be a source of some comfort to 
the judge confronting the pressure to rule in some fashion when he can perceive only dimly or not 
at all the dimensions of the material facts,” but that “we should avoid finding too much comfort in 
this assurance that there will be time to correct the mistakes.” Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary 
Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 42 (1968). 
88 6 F.3d 177, 190 (4th Cir. 1993). 
89 Id. at 182. The Third Circuit had affirmed the certification of a nationwide class action for 
compensatory damages in In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 998-99 (3d Cir. 1986). Six 
years later, the Third Circuit reported in a subsequent appeal that “numerous delays” had plagued 
preparations for trial, and the district court was only prepared to move forward on a trial 
regarding conspiracy and concert of action that was divided across several trials with discrete 
groups of defendants “[i]n order to keep trial manageable.” In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 
764, 772 (3d Cir. 1992). In that same appeal, the district judge was removed from the case because 
of an appearance of partiality created by his attendance at a plaintiff-centric conference, creating 
yet more challenges in bringing the case to trial. Id. at 778-88. 
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ruling “with the caution befitting contemplation of any experimental 
mechanism.”90 Even so, the court affirmed.91 
The district court had expressly invoked the conditional certification 
provision of old Rule 23(c)(1)(C) in its order, a point that the Fourth Circuit 
emphasized in explaining its affirmance.92 Some factual questions remained 
to be answered about the suitability of the named plaintiff to represent the 
entire class of defendants, questions as to which the district court “de-
fer[red] a final decision” pending later discovery to determine which 
products were installed in which institutions.93 Under currently controlling 
authority, a district court would need to satisfy itself that the requirements 
of Rule 23 were satisfied prior to certifying the class, with sufficient discovery 
in the certification hearing to support a “rigorous analysis.”94 That compo-
nent of the district court’s ruling probably does not survive subsequent 
doctrinal developments.  
But the primary role that the Fourth Circuit recognized for experimen-
tation in class certification did not concern the district court’s deferral of 
questions relating to typicality and adequacy. Rather, the greatest source of 
concern related to the manageability of large asbestos proceedings and the 
systemic benefit that class certification would provide when measured 
against other forms of consolidation—questions that lower federal courts 
were struggling to answer at the time. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged 
the troubled history of the school district litigation as a cautionary tale but 
also believed that the district court’s certification was based on a reasonable 
hope that “[l]essons . . . have been learned from the litigation in Philadelphia,” 
and that the suit before it represented “an opportunity to apply” those 
lessons.95 That being so, the appeals court held the certification order fell 
within the district court’s “considerable discretion” to employ the class 
device “to assist in resolving asbestos litigation nationwide and to avoid 
some of the enormous waste of resources that could accompany individual 
litigation.”96 
These efforts to apply the class mechanism to property damage claims 
cannot claim wild success. The Supreme Court’s two major statements on 

90 Cent. Wesleyan Coll., 6 F.3d at 183. 
91 Id. at 190. 
92 See id. at 186 (“The tentative, limited nature of the conditional certification also counsels 
in favor of affirmance.”). 
93 Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 143 F.R.D. 628, 642 (D.S.C. 1992). 
94 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
95 Cent. Wesleyan Coll., 6 F.3d at 186. 
96 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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asbestos litigation did not address property damage claims directly,97 but 
the limits they imposed would apply in equal measure in such cases, and the 
subsequent history of property claims in the federal courts is one of bank-
ruptcy rather than class litigation.98 Asbestos claims are perhaps the most 
acute example of what Judge Friendly described as a specific area of sub-
stantive litigation in which discretion comes to be constrained by the 
articulation of controlling principles by appellate courts.99 Even in such a 
case, however, discretion to experiment plays a role, providing practical 
experience with litigation dynamics and an opportunity to explore doctrinal 
solutions. It is this type of expertise that can eventually make clear the need 
for constraints upon discretion. 
B. Management of Class Proceedings 
Rule 23(b)(3) expressly requires the trial court to consider “the likely 
difficulties in managing a class action”100 in a proceeding certified under that 
provision—a requirement normally associated with the workability of a trial 
and associated liability and damages determinations. Distinct from that type 
of “manageability” concern is the more prosaic management of the opera-
tions of a class proceeding on a day-to-day basis, including the behavior of 
the participating lawyers and parties. Discretion in this sort of internal 
management of class proceedings has always been recognized as a necessary 
feature of modern Rule 23. 101  Judge Marvin E. Frankel explored this 
proposition in his Preliminary Observations, published shortly after the 1966 
revisions. In that essay, he introduces his analysis of select provisions of the 
new Rule in the following terms: 

97 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999) (holding a (b)(1)(B) mandatory 
settlement class could not be used to settle asbestos litigation); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1996) (rejecting a (b)(3) settlement class used to resolve asbestos litigation). 
98 See, e.g., In re W.R. Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 311, 314-15 (3d Cir. 2013) (detailing the prolifer-
ation of lawsuits against the defendant in Central Wesleyan College that ultimately led the company 
to seek protection and discharge in bankruptcy). 
99 See Friendly, supra note 13, at 754-55 (suggesting that certain areas of law may require 
“rigid rules” to promote the “interest of certainty”). 
100 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 
101 The Sixth Circuit has suggested a link between the discretion of district courts in matters 
relating to class certification and “the inherent power [of a trial court] to manage and control its 
own pending litigation.” Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2007). This 
framing of the issue appears to imply a broad formulation of the deference owed the district court 
in the exercise of that discretion. See id. at 559-60 (“The district court’s decision certifying the 
class is subject to a very limited review and will be reversed only upon a strong showing that the 
district court’s decision was a clear abuse of discretion.” (quoting Olden v. Lafarge Corp., 383 F.3d 
495, 507 (6th Cir. 2004))). 
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The revisions in Rule 23 effective July 1, 1966, effect broad and challenging 
innovations. The dimensions of the changes cannot possibly be stated in 
certain detail at this early stage of their existence. The Rule—quite deliber-
ately, I think—tends to ask more questions than it answers. It is neither a 
set of prescriptions nor a blue print. It is, rather, a broad outline of general 
policies and directions. As the commentators have said, it confides to the 
district judges a broad range of discretion. And this means, as you all know 
so well, not that we’re about to get drunk with power, but that we’ve been 
challenged to piece out a huge body of procedural common law by giving all 
the hard labor and creative imagination we can muster for this purpose.102 
Judge Frankel went on to identify a range of issues, including class notice 
and the timing of the certification hearing, that would require creativity and 
adaptability from courts applying the new rule.103 
These predictions were quickly reflected in the case law. Matters involv-
ing the form and content of notice to the class were regularly recognized as 
requiring discretion on the part of trial courts. In Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. 
Christensen, one of the early appellate rulings under the new Rule, the Tenth 
Circuit denied a request for mandamus intervention following a district 
court’s order certifying an antitrust class under Rule 23(b)(3) and directing 
that notice be provided to the class members.104 Assessing the content of the 
notice, the appellate court found that the trial judge had included all the 
information expressly required by Rule 23 along with enough additional 
guidance to allow class members to make a decision without being overwhelmed 
with detail.105 As the court explained, “the Rule places the control of class 
actions and in particular the issuance of notice to members of the class 
under the control and thus the discretion of the trial judge,” calling for a 
light hand in any appellate review.106  

102 Frankel, supra note 87, at 39 (footnote omitted). 
103 See id. at 40-41 (noting that amended Rule 23 does not specifically address the problems 
attendant to notice and timing, and calling on judges to answer these questions in the particular 
circumstances); see also Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1561, 1601-02 (2003) (describing the period following the 1966 revision to Rule 23 and explaining 
that “from the start, the rule was heavily laden with discretionary elements”). 
104 436 F.2d 791, 799 (10th Cir. 1970). 
105 Id. at 798-99. This balance between pertinent information and clear, concise notice came 
to be recognized by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules as a best practice of sufficient 
importance to warrant codification in the 2003 amendments. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) 
advisory committee’s note to the 2003 amendments (specifying an expanded list of requirements 
for the content of class notice and mandating that notice clearly and concisely state those materials 
“in plain, easily understood language”). 
106 Gold Strike Stamp, 436 F.2d at 799. 
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The Supreme Court addressed questions of internal management in Gulf 
Oil Co. v. Bernard, a case involving a broad district court order that limited 
the ability of class counsel to communicate with the members of a Title VII 
class.107 Noting “the potential for abuse” in the powerful forces put in 
motion by the class mechanism, the Court held that district courts require 
broad discretion “to exercise control over a class action and to enter appro-
priate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties.” 108  When 
management orders are restrictive or invasive, they must “be based on a 
clear record and specific findings” indicating a weighing of competing 
interests, a requirement that the Court found not to be satisfied in the order 
before it.109 Bernard remains the governing authority concerning restraints 
on communication with class members, and it is regularly cited by lower 
federal courts for the broad but bounded discretion that district courts enjoy 
to manage the processes by which a class action is analyzed and conducted.110 
C. Redefinition of the Class 
The power of a district court to alter the definition or scope of a plain-
tiff ’s proposed class is also well established among the lower federal courts. 
Much less widely appreciated is the imprimatur that the Supreme Court has 
given to discretionary decisions on such matters. Califano v. Yamasaki 
contains one of the Court’s most oft-cited statements on discretion in class 
certification: “[M]ost issues arising under Rule 23[ are] committed in the 
first instance to the discretion of the district court.”111 This statement is 
typically offered as generic authority for the existence of discretion in the 
certification analysis.112 The passages from which the sentence is lifted, 
however, are more specific. The Court in Yamasaki recognized two proposi-
tions: (1) that district courts presented with a putative nationwide class have 

107 452 U.S. 89, 103-04 (1981). 
108 Id. at 100. 
109 Id. at 101-02. 
110 See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The trial court has 
broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class, but that discretion must be exercised within 
the framework of Rule 23.” (citing Bernard, 452 U.S. at 100)). 
111 442 U.S. 682, 703 (1979). 
112 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2562 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Yamasaki for the proposition that an appellate court 
should not overturn a district court’s certification unless there is an error of law or abuse of 
discretion); A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to 
Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 477 & n.195 (2013) (citing Yamasaki to support the proposition that 
“[e]ven in the class context, appellate courts are not in the position to provide de novo review of 
factual evidence, giving their own assessments without regard to the findings of the district 
court”). 
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the discretion to certify a class of lesser scope, and (2) that courts may take 
into account systemic considerations not specified in Rule 23 when deciding 
whether to exercise that discretion.113 
Yamasaki involved a consolidated pair of cases in which recipients of Social 
Security benefits challenged an effort by the Social Security Administration 
to recoup overpayments from beneficiaries by withholding future benefits 
without first granting individual hearings to the affected recipients.114 In 
one case, the plaintiffs sought a statewide class action for residents of 
Hawaii, which the district court certified.115 In the other, Washington state 
plaintiffs requested a nationwide class action.116 The district court granted 
the request for certification, but it exempted from the class definition 
residents of Hawaii and of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (where 
another proceeding had been initiated), as well as any individuals who “had 
participated as plaintiffs or members of a plaintiff class in litigation against 
the Secretary on similar issues.”117 
On appeal, the Secretary argued broadly that class certification was cate-
gorically inappropriate under the judicial review provisions of the Social 
Security Act and, in the alternative, that a nationwide class was inappropriate 
in a case of the type before the court.118 The Supreme Court rejected the 
first argument, imposing a clear-statement rule that requires Congress to 
exclude class relief expressly if it wishes a statute to exclude the possibility 
of that tool.119 The Court treated the second argument as a variation on the 
first—here, a request for a ruling that a nationwide class is categorically 
inappropriate under Rule 23 itself in Social Security disputes of this kind—
and it rejected that request as well.120 But it was the categorical nature of 
the argument that the Court rejected. The underlying challenge to the 
suitability of such disputes to nationwide class treatment received more 
sympathetic treatment: 
We concede the force of the Secretary’s contentions that nationwide class 
actions may have a detrimental effect by foreclosing adjudication by a number 

113 See Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 702-03 (“[A] federal court when asked to certify a nationwide 
class should take care to ensure that nationwide relief is indeed appropriate . . . and that 
certification of such a class would not improperly interfere with the litigation of similar issues in 
other judicial districts.”). 
114 Id. at 684. 
115 Id. at 687-88. 
116 Id. at 689. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 698-99. 
119 Id. at 700. 
120 Id. at 700-01. 
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of different courts and judges, and of increasing, in certain cases, the pres-
sures on this Court’s docket. It often will be preferable to allow several 
courts to pass on a given class claim in order to gain the benefit of adjudica-
tion by different courts in different factual contexts. For this reason, a fed-
eral court when asked to certify a nationwide class should take care to 
ensure that nationwide relief is indeed appropriate in the case before it, and 
that certification of such a class would not improperly interfere with the 
litigation of similar issues in other judicial districts. But we decline to adopt 
the extreme position that such a class may never be certified. The certifica-
tion of a nationwide class, like most issues arising under Rule 23, is commit-
ted in the first instance to the discretion of the district court. On the facts 
of this case we cannot conclude that the District Court in [the nationwide 
case] abused that discretion, especially in light of its sensitivity to ongoing 
litigation of the same issue in other districts, and the determination that 
counsel was adequate to represent the class.121 
Since the significance of this passage to the discretion of certifying courts 
appears never to have been fully appreciated in the literature, the Court’s 
analysis warrants careful exposition. In explaining its rejection of the 
Secretary’s categorical argument about nationwide classes, the Court 
emphasized that “[n]othing in Rule 23 . . . limits the geographical scope of 
a class action that is brought in conformity with that Rule.”122 That is, the 
Rule offers no express statement imposing such a limitation. Given the 
posture of the Secretary’s claim, the Court could have taken this silence on 
geography to indicate that the rule gives district courts no power to limit 
the scope of a plaintiff ’s putative class action, so long as the suit is “brought 
in conformity with” the provisions of Rule 23. But the Court did no such 
thing. 
Yamasaki recognizes discretion in the district court to determine the ap-
propriate scope of a proposed class proceeding, even in a proceeding that 
satisfies the express terms of the rule. The Secretary lost his appeal because 
the district court had not “abused that discretion” given the steps it took to 
avoid interference with other pending proceedings.123 In deciding when to 
permit a nationwide injunctive class, Yamasaki explains, district courts 
should take into account systemic considerations that are unaddressed in the 
text of Rule 23(b)(2), including the possibility of “improper[] interfere[nce] 
with the litigation of similar issues in other judicial districts.” 124  The 

121 Id. at 702-03. 
122 Id. at 702. 
123 Id. at 703. 
124 Id. at 702. 
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question of how to assess the impropriety of such interference in quality 
and degree in any given case is left to the discretion of future district 
courts.125 
Yamasaki was a (b)(2) action seeking an injunction, and one portion of 
the Court’s analysis ties its holding to equitable principles concerning the 
proper scope of injunctive relief, explaining that there is no cause for a 
categorical prohibition on nationwide class actions in this type of Social 
Security claim because “the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the 
extent of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of the 
plaintiff class.”126 The Court allowed for the possibility that a broad class 
definition in an equitable proceeding might afford relief “more burdensome 
than necessary to redress the complaining parties,”127 a circumstance that 
would call for constraining the class. In other words, a (b)(2) injunctive 
proceeding might create the prospect of unnecessary burdens on the 
defendant and provoke systemic concerns about interference with parallel or 
related court proceedings. These would both be grounds for a district court 
to exercise discretion in certifying a narrower proceeding than the one 
proposed by the plaintiff.128  
Lower federal courts have not generally relied upon Yamasaki in exercis-
ing discretionary authority to reformulate a plaintiff ’s proposed class 
definition. Instead, they have claimed that authority in a wide variety of 
settings and treated it as a natural extension of their discretion to decide 
whether to certify at all. 
In its most basic form, a court’s modification of the class definition can 
operate to harmonize the certified class with the actual course of the 

125 In a damages class action brought under Rule 23(b)(3), these considerations may form a 
part of the superiority analysis, which invites the court to consider “the extent and nature of any 
litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members” and “the 
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(B)-(C). No explicit license of this kind appears in Rule 23(b)(2). 
126 Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 702. 
127 Id. 
128 Rule 23(c) confirms the authority of a district court to issue orders that “define the class.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B). There is room for debate as to whether Rule 23(c)(1)(B) is only a 
housekeeping provision designed to ensure regularity between the class certification order, the 
litigated proceeding, and any resulting judgment, or whether it confers authority upon the court to 
shape the class according to its own judgment. Compare Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 
F.3d 583, 591-92 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying Rule 23(c)(1)(B) as a housekeeping provision to 
“provid[e] the parties with clarity and assist[] class members in understanding their rights”), with 
Pyke v. Cuomo, 209 F.R.D. 33, 38-40 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (employing Rule 23(c)(1)(B) as both a 
housekeeping provision and an occasion to make judgments about the scope of the class). On 
either reading, Yamasaki’s acknowledgment of extra-textual discretionary considerations is 
significant for discussions of class scope. 
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proceedings. In Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd., for example, the Sixth Circuit 
found that a putative nationwide class action instituted against an Ohio 
medical clinic was overbroad.129 The court deemed the nationwide scope of 
the class unnecessary in light of the narrow population of affected individu-
als—patients of a clinic that operated only in Ohio and West Virginia—and 
observed that the trial court and the parties had focused their efforts only 
on claims by Ohio citizens governed by Ohio law, raising questions about 
whether the interests of any claimants outside Ohio were properly repre-
sented. 130  Nonetheless, rather than reversing the judgment below and 
decertifying the class, the court deemed it appropriate instead “to amend 
the class certification so that the class includes the named plaintiffs and 
those similarly situated”131—a sua sponte modification that would “bring[] 
the formal certification into conformity with the class definition that the 
parties and the court below believed to have been certified.”132 In a similar 
ruling issued shortly following the 1966 amendments, a Minnesota district 
court hearing a constitutional challenge to a property seizure statute 
rejected the class definition proposed by the plaintiff and adopted a modi-
fied definition that solved ascertainability problems and still permitted the 
core of the plaintiff ’s challenge to be certified.133 The court noted: “The fact 
that plaintiff ’s definition of the class needed modification does not require 
dismissal of the class action” because “[a] court can, in its discretion under 
the Rule, define a class in a manner which will allow utilization of the class 
action procedure.”134 
Federal courts have also reformulated class definitions in a more aggres-
sive fashion, reshaping the action to resolve problems under Rule 23 and 
authorize a proceeding that the court deems suitable for representative 
treatment, even if the resulting action differs significantly from the one 
proposed by the plaintiff. A ruling by Judge Colleen McMahon of the 
Southern District of New York offers a useful illustration. In Maneely v. City 
of Newburgh, plaintiff Maneely had been arrested on a misdemeanor charge 
and subjected to a strip search that he believed to be unjustified.135 His 
search allegedly happened pursuant to a city policy of subjecting all 
arrestees to strip search without regard to whether there was reasonable 

129 110 F.3d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1997). 
130 Id. at 1214. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 1215. 
133 Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245, 249 (D. Minn. 1971). 
134 Id. 
135 208 F.R.D. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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suspicion to believe the arrestee possessed contraband or a weapon.136 
Maneely sought to represent a class of arrestees subjected to strip search 
without cause and to secure damages on their behalf under Rule 23(b)(3).137 
As proposed by the plaintiff, however, the class presented problems of 
adequacy of representation and class definition, since every arrestee (including 
Maneely) would require a hearing on the circumstances of his or her arrest 
to establish that the search was without cause and demonstrate membership 
in the class.138 Rather than simply deny certification of the proposed action, 
however, the court exercised its discretion to certify a different class: “I am 
not going to certify the class Maneely seeks to represent. Instead, I am 
going to certify a broader class, but on a narrower issue . . . .”139 The judge 
employed the provision for class actions “with respect to particular issues”140 
to certify a class “as to the issue of whether the City of Newburgh main-
tained a policy of strip searching all pre-arraignment prisoners, with or 
without having reasonable suspicion to believe that these persons were 
carrying or concealing weapons or contraband,” on behalf of “all persons 
who were strip searched before arraignment” within a specified time 
period.141 If the class prevailed, she explained, arrestees could then assert 
their damages claims in individual suits.142 
Judge Shelby Highsmith of the Southern District of Florida also used an 
aggressive reformulation in a suit challenging GEICO’s practice of only 
reimbursing insured claimants for a portion of their deductible when 
GEICO succeeded in securing only a portion of the requested recovery 
from the adverse insurer.143 Plaintiff Rosemary Powers sought to recover 
damages under Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of a nationwide class, but the court 
found that differences in applicable state law created serious predominance 
problems and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that those problems 
could be overcome.144 Acting on its own, however, the court did find that a 
statewide class would pass muster, and it certified that class sua sponte: 

136 Id. 
137 Id. at 70-71. 
138 See id. at 76 (“No person could become a member of the class [the plaintiff ] proposes to 
represent . . . until it was determined there was no reasonable suspicion for a search in his 
individual case.”). 
139 Id. 
140 That provision is currently codified at FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). It was Rule 23(c)(4)(A) 
in the version of the Rule that Judge McMahon was employing. Maneely, 208 F.R.D. at 78. 
141 Maneely, 208 F.R.D. at 78. 
142 Id. at 79. 
143 See Powers v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 192 F.R.D. 313, 315 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (describing 
GEICO’s reimbursement policy). 
144 Id. at 318-19. 
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“Powers has not proposed any alternative classes. However, this Court finds 
that certification of a class comprised of Geico insureds from the State of 
Florida satisfies all of the requisite elements for certification.”145 The court 
granted the motion for class certification, but on terms substantially differ-
ent from those proposed by plaintiff.146 
Judge John Nixon of the Middle District of Tennessee claimed a similar 
authority when adjudicating a request for class certification in Craft v. 
Vanderbilt University, a case involving allegations of improper medical 
experimentation upon pregnant women.147 Concluding that the class as 
proposed would exhibit serious manageability problems, Judge Nixon 
emphasized his “broad discretion in determining whether an action should 
be certified as a class action.”148 This discretion encompassed a power “to 
modify or reformulate existing classes in the interest of manageability or 
other factors bearing upon class appropriateness.”149 He thus decertified the 
offending portion of the class and replaced it with an individually adminis-
tered rebuttable presumption for the affected claimants, a mechanism that 
he believed was indicated by the underlying substantive law.150 
And in a Title VII action against Wal-Mart alleging racial discrimination 
against applicants for truck driving positions, Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc.,151 Judge Billy Roy Wilson determined that he should not certify a class 
that included punitive damage claims for fear that res judicata might 
foreclose compensatory damage claims that individual drivers might wish to 
pursue, potentially compromising the required commonality of interest 
among class members.152 Rather than refuse certification altogether, Judge 
Wilson acted on his own to sever punitive damages from the class proposal 
and certify “a class only on the issues of classwide liability and declaratory 
and equitable relief.”153 

145 Id. at 320. 
146 Id. 
147 174 F.R.D. 396, 400-01 (M.D. Tenn. 1996). 
148 Id. at 403. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 403-04. 
151 245 F.R.D. 358 (E.D. Ark. 2007). 
152 Id. at 372-73 (citing Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of 
Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1078 (2002)) (noting that claims for punitive 
damages, but not compensatory damages, would likely be barred in subsequent litigation). For a 
treatment of this species of res judicata concern, see generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion 
in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005). 
153 Nelson, 245 F.R.D. at 373 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(A) (current version at FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(c)(4))). 
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Several themes emerge from the body of practice exemplified by these 
cases involving judicial reformulation of the class definition. First, the 
discretionary power that federal courts possess to reshape the boundaries 
and composition of the class is continuous with their power to decide 
whether to certify at all. Some courts explicitly draw that connection in 
describing their authority over class definition,154 and it is a connection 
necessitated by the practical impact of this form of class management. To 
restructure a proposed nationwide class into a statewide proceeding, or to 
refocus the class definition onto a different aspect of the plaintiff ’s claim, is 
to change the nature of the proceeding qualitatively. When the plaintiff 
proposes a class that the court determines cannot be certified, the court has 
the option of simply refusing. When, instead, the court elects to redefine 
the class in the ways explored above, that action entails a determination that 
reformulating the class will better serve the purposes of Rule 23 and the 
underlying policies of the substantive law than would denying certification 
altogether. In making that determination, the court issues a discretionary 
decision as to whether or not a class action should occur. 
A second theme is closely related: In cases involving class definition, 
federal courts view proposed class actions as embodying a significant 
element of public trust. When a plaintiff and her attorney file a lawsuit 
seeking to represent a class of people they do not know, it is not their sole 
prerogative to set the terms on which they will pursue claims on behalf of 
the class. Rather, they embark upon a representation the nature and terms 
of which may have to be set by the court.155 In theory, a named plaintiff 
could insist upon withdrawing as the class representative when a proceeding 
is reshaped in ways that she disapproves, but that kind of protest would be 
self-defeating in most cases, and the ethical responsibilities of class counsel 
might foreclose such self-regarding caprice.156 It is not the prerogative of 

154 See id. at 365, 373 (framing its power in the certification process by explaining that “[t]he 
decision whether to certify a class action is left to the sound discretion of the district court” and 
then severing a portion of the proposed class rather than denying certification altogether). 
155 The Second Circuit made a similar observation in an early decision concerning attorney’s 
fees under modern Rule 23. In Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045, 1050 (2d 
Cir. 1973), the court explained that a class action does not proceed “through simple operation of 
the private enterprise system”; rather, “both the class determination and designation of counsel as 
class representative come through judicial determinations, and the attorney so benefited serves in 
something of a position of public trust.” Several other courts have pointed to this statement by the 
Second Circuit in describing the particular nature of the ethical and professional duties that class 
counsel bear in a representative proceeding. See, e.g., Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 756 F.2d 1285, 
1294 n.5 (7th Cir. 1985) (“We judges can certainly appreciate that there are times when a public 
trust resembles indentured servitude, but we are rarely able to alter that situation.”). 
156 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (stating that class counsel has a duty to fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of the class); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(1) (2013) 
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representative plaintiffs or class counsel to adopt a “my way or the highway” 
attitude toward a class proceeding. Rather, by filing a proposed class action, 
plaintiffs and their lawyers initiate a dialogue with the court in which their 
proposals and preferences are measured against the express requirements 
and limitations of Rule 23 and balanced against the court’s determination 
regarding the best type of representative proceeding under the governing law. 
Third, federal courts have not been limited to the express provisions of 
Rule 23 when exercising their discretion to alter the scope or definition of a 
proposed class. Their discretion is not unbounded, of course, and courts 
frequently employ the underlying substantive law to guide them in deciding 
questions of definition and scope in class certification, as in the Craft and 
Nelson decisions above. But the text of the Rule does not purport to enu-
merate all the factors that a court might consider in making these determi-
nations. Thus, in Yamasaki, the Supreme Court recognized the authority of 
a court to consider systemic impact when entertaining a proposed injunctive 
proceeding. That species of concern is expressly authorized for damages 
actions in the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) but is not specified 
in section (b)(2). Even so, the Yamasaki Court acknowledged systemic 
impact as an appropriate extra-textual consideration. 
D. Discretion Not to Certify 
The discretion not to certify a class—to exercise judgment in deciding 
whether aggregate treatment is appropriate at all, even if the requirements 
of Rule 23 are satisfied—is the most consequential form of control that a 
federal court can exercise in a putative class action proceeding. With the 
elimination of the conditional certification provision from Rule 23(c)(3)(C) 
and the Court’s recent emphasis on the need for a “rigorous analysis” prior 
to certification,157 a court has minimal power to authorize class certification 
outside the clear boundaries of Rule 23’s text. In contrast, the discretion not 
to certify has formed a significant part of the class action jurisprudence of 
the federal courts since the enactment of the 1966 revisions to Rule 23. It 
has found expression in highly influential rulings by the lower federal courts 
and enjoyed a partial imprimatur from the Supreme Court itself. Some 
rulings have lodged the discretion not to certify in the superiority require-
ment for cases filed under Rule 23(b)(3) or in the tradition of discretionary 

(limiting ability of counsel to withdraw from representation where doing so would impose a 
“material adverse effect on the interests of the client”). 
157 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011) (“[C]ertification is 
proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23 
have been satisfied . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
  
2014] Discretion in Class Certification 1927 
 
control over equitable relief in (b)(2) actions. Others have not felt the need 
for such textual positioning, instead relying directly upon the discretion 
inherent in Rule 23. In many of these cases, courts have based their judg-
ments upon an assessment of the underlying law and the impact that a class 
action would have upon substantive policies. But courts have also exercised 
the discretion not to certify in response to litigation dynamics not specifi-
cally tied to any substantive legal regime. 
The first major ruling to explore substantive law reasons for exercising 
discretion not to certify, and the most influential opinion of its kind for 
some years, was Judge Marvin Frankel’s decision in Ratner v. Chemical Bank 
New York Trust Co.158 The defendant in Ratner had failed to include a 
required disclosure on an initial credit card statement concerning the annual 
percentage rate of interest, and a cardholder brought suit under the TILA 
seeking to represent 130,000 others under Rule 23(b)(3) and claiming 
statutory damages of at least $100 per person.159 The violation was technical 
in nature—the company had disclosed the rate in other communications, 
provided the required disclosure on subsequent credit card statements, and 
corrected the omission on the initial statement when made aware of it.160 
The initial omission was still a violation of the clear terms of the TILA, 
however, and entitled the plaintiff to summary judgment on the merits.161 
The case also seemed particularly well-suited to class treatment: the omis-
sion was identical for all cardholders, there was no requirement to show 
individual reliance, and the statutory damages provision eliminated any 
need for individual proof of harm. Many other district courts had previously 
certified classes in similar TILA disputes.162 
Judge Frankel denied the request to certify the class in a brief opinion 
that began with the following summary of reasons: 
 (1) there is no affirmative need or justification for such a proceeding in 
the actual circumstances of the case; and 
 (2) the allowance of thousands of minimum recoveries like plaintiff ’s 
would carry to an absurd and stultifying extreme the specific and essentially 

158 Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
159 Id. at 413-14. 
160 Id. at 414, 416. 
161 Judge Frankel addressed the merits at length in a separate reported opinion, Ratner v. 
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), granting summary 
judgment to the individual plaintiff on the merits. 
162 See infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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inconsistent remedy Congress prescribed as the means of private enforce-
ment.163 
The “broad and open-ended terms” of the newly revised Rule called for “the 
exercise of some considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature” in making 
certification determinations, the court continued, and permitting a massive 
class-wide remedy for technical violations that had already been corrected 
would impose “horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment, unrelated to 
any damage to the purported class or to any benefit to defendant,” a result 
that would be inconsistent with Congress’s purpose in enacting the TILA.164 
Invoking the superiority requirement (albeit as something of an after-
thought), Judge Frankel declined the request for certification and instead 
entered judgment on Ratner’s individual claim.165 
Ratner had a dramatic impact on TILA litigation and subsequent legisla-
tive developments. In one illustrative 1973 case, Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of 
Kansas City, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of class 
certification in a TILA case involving a broader set of alleged failures to 
disclose required information in credit card statements, with a total poten-
tial liability of over one billion dollars. 166  Relying on Judge Frankel’s 
opinion, the court of appeals rejected the proposition that class actions must 
be available either always or never for TILA violations. Instead, it author-
ized a discretionary approach “in view of a congressional confidence in case 
by case determinations” about the propriety of class certification “by 
qualified and informed trial judges with a wide general discretion and 
specific leeway under Rule 23 itself to avoid inferior, unfair or senseless 
applications” of the statute.167 A report of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs concerning the amendments to the TILA 
enacted in 1974 described Ratner as the “leading case” on TILA class actions 
and quantified its impact: 
Prior to the Ratner decision on February 14, 1972, the courts affirmed 8 
Truth in Lending suits as class actions while denying class action status to 3. 
Since the Ratner case, the courts denied 21 Truth in Lending suits class 
action status while affirming only one and in that case, only after the plain-
tiffs amended their complaint to sue only for actual damages.168 

163 Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 414. 
164 Id. at 416. 
165 Id. 
166 474 F.2d 336, 340, 349 (10th Cir. 1973). 
167 Id. at 344. 
168 S. REP. NO. 93-278, at 14 (1973) (Conf. Rep.) (italics added). 
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The amendments responded to Ratner’s use of trial court discretion to avoid 
industry-destroying liability by imposing a statutory cap of $100,000 on 
total classwide damages in order to remove the crushing potential of 
classwide liability and preserve the feasibility of class remedies for private 
enforcement.169 Further amendments in 1976 raised the damages cap to 
$500,000 to ensure that private enforcement would remain a financially 
viable mechanism for plaintiffs’ lawyers.170 The discretion not to certify that 
Judge Frankel and others exercised in the early TILA cases did not provoke 
a congressional rebuke; rather, it initiated a dialogue with Congress that 
preserved the private remedy under the statute while reducing the need for 
courts to apply a safety valve.171 
The TILA cases were the first major occasion where the lower federal 
courts systematically exercised discretion not to certify under modern Rule 
23, but they are not singular. Courts have exercised that prerogative in a 
range of substantive contexts since the 1966 revisions. In some cases, courts 
have grounded the decision to deny certification on an assessment of the 
impact that class treatment would have upon the specific policies reflected 
in the law underlying the dispute, as in Ratner and its progeny. In others, 
like the widely cited opinion of Judge Posner in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 
Inc.,172 courts have identified the potential impact of class certification on 
shared social policies as a basis for exercising discretion in deciding when 
class certification is advisable without tying their analysis to any particular 
substantive legal regime. And in still others, courts have invoked institu-
tional principles not directly linked to substantive policy, particularly in 
cases involving government defendants in which the class device is invoked 

169 See id. at 14-15 (noting that the purpose of TILA’s civil penalties section “was to provide 
creditors with a meaningful incentive to comply with the law” but that this purpose could “be 
achieved without subjecting creditors to enormous penalties”).  
170 The report of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs regarding the 1976 
amendments described the purpose of the increased statutory cap in the following terms: 
The Committee wishes to avoid any implication that the ceiling on class action recovery 
is meant to discourage use of the class action device. The recommended $500,000 limit, 
coupled with the 1% formula, provides, we believe, a workable structure for private 
enforcement. Small businesses are protected by the 1% measure, while a potential half 
million dollar recovery ought to act as a significant deterrent to even the largest creditor. 
S. REP. NO. 94-590, at 8 (1976) (Conf. Rep.). 
171 Although the need to apply a safety valve was reduced, it was not eliminated: some dis-
trict courts continued to exercise discretion not to certify in TILA cases following the 1974 and 
1976 amendments in cases where they believed that the purposes of the remedy would be 
subverted by class treatment. These decisions sometimes received deferential treatment from the 
courts of appeals. See, e.g., Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc., 618 F.2d 398, 404 (6th Cir. 1980) 
(holding class certification may be denied even in cases involving only technical violations). 
172 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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primarily as a tool for ensuring broad compliance. The range is broad and 
the record deep.  
The Supreme Court of the United States has never issued a major holding 
on the discretion not to certify, but the Court has assumed and relied upon 
the existence of such discretion. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the Supreme 
Court confronted an antitrust question regarding the availability of treble 
damages in consumer lawsuits.173 The case involved allegations of price 
fixing in the market for hearing aids that increased the cost of the product, 
and the plaintiff, a consumer, sought treble damages on behalf of all retail 
purchasers of the affected devices.174 The appellate court held that treble 
damages were unavailable because an individual consumer was not injured 
in her “business or property” by anticompetitive behavior (a requirement 
under the statute),175 but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that “the 
word ‘property’ has a naturally broad and inclusive meaning” that necessarily 
includes a consumer’s loss of money when paying inflated prices for 
goods.176 The defendants protested that making treble damages available in 
consumer class actions would “have a potentially ruinous effect on small 
businesses in particular and will ultimately be paid by consumers in any 
event,” urging the Court to find the remedy wholly unavailable in that 
category of cases. 177 The Court acknowledged the importance of these 
concerns but found that the “plain language” of the Clayton Act precluded a 
holding that consumers were ineligible for treble damages.178 Nevertheless, 
as in Yamasaki—which was heard in the same Term and handed down nine 
days after Reiter—the Court went on to opine on the important systemic 
role of federal court discretion in potentially troublesome categories of class 
proceeding: 
District courts must be especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought 
to extort nuisance settlements; they have broad power and discretion vested 
in them by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 with respect to matters involving the 
certification and management of potentially cumbersome or frivolous class 
actions. Recognition of the plain meaning of the statutory language “business 
or property” need not result in administrative chaos, class-action harassment, 

173 442 U.S. 330, 335 (1979). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 336. 
176 Id. at 338-39, 345. 
177 Id. at 344-45. 
178 Id. at 345. 
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or “windfall” settlements if the district courts exercise sound discretion and 
use the tools available.179 
Treble damages in consumer claims need not produce extortion, the Reiter 
Court concluded, because frivolous claimants could be prevented from 
obtaining windfall class settlements through the “broad power and discre-
tion” that the district court possesses to decide whether and under what 
conditions to certify a class.180 Judge Friendly drew upon this passage in 
Abrams when describing the nature of federal court discretion in a consumer 
class action alleging price fixing,181 and lower courts have drawn upon Reiter 
when exploring the meaning and application of this discretionary mechanism 
of control in a variety of cases, many (though not all) involving antitrust 
disputes.182 

179 Id. (citations omitted). Reiter postdates by five years the Court’s ruling in Eisen v. Carlisle 
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The Reiter Court apparently deemed it obvious that a district 
court had discretion to determine whether certification was appropriate where the plaintiff ’s 
claims appeared “frivolous,” id. at 345, a proposition at odds with the received account of Eisen as a 
case prohibiting district courts from basing certification decisions on an initial assessment of the 
merits. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2008) (high-
lighting and rejecting this received account of Eisen). Eisen’s actual holding was that the district 
court abused its discretion when it imposed the costs of notice upon the defendant based upon a 
positive assessment of the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, a procedure that “allow[s] a representa-
tive plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without first satisfying the requirements for it.” 
417 U.S. at 177. The Eisen Court introduced that holding with the broadly worded sentence, now 
notorious, that “nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 [] gives a court any authority 
to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be 
maintained as a class action.” Id. The Court has since clarified the limited significance of that 
language. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011) (noting that rigorous 
analysis of certification may entail some overlap with the merits). 
180 Reiter, 442 U.S. at 345. 
181 See Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Court [in Reiter] empha-
sized the broad power and discretion vested in the courts by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 . . . .”). 
182 See, e.g., In re Datapoint Corp., 1996 WL 673320, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 1996) (relying 
upon Reiter to grant a district court broad leeway to decline to certify until and unless it has a high 
level of confidence that certification of a novel defendant class would be appropriate); Greenhaw v. 
Lubbock Cnty. Beverage Ass’n, 721 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983) (recognizing Reiter’s invitation 
to deny certification in cases involving “frivolous and unmeritorious” claims but affirming the 
district court in rejecting the argument that denial of certification is warranted solely because class 
counsel will receive greater compensation than any individual class member), overruled on other 
grounds by Int’l Woodworkers of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174, 1181 n.8 (5th Cir. 
1986); Marks v. S.F. Real Estate Bd., 627 F.2d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 1980) (opinion of Larson, J.)  
(citing the language regarding discretion in Reiter as a negative example to the case before him, a 
consumer antitrust case where defendants argued that the extent of their liability exposure 
counseled against certification of a class). 
Justice Breyer also draws upon Reiter in his separate opinions in both Amchem and Ortiz, 
although he cites the case out of context, offering Reiter as support for an expansive account of a 
district court’s discretion to certify in cases requiring experimentation, rather than as a basis for 
denying certification in cases calling for a safety valve. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 
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The superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) often serves as the doctrinal 
home for policy-driven determinations that certification is unwarranted. 
Indeed, in one price-fixing ruling that predated Reiter by several years, 
Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district 
court’s denial of class certification on superiority grounds, with a brief 
discussion that identified superiority determinations as lying “in an area 
where the trial court’s discretion is paramount.”183 But courts have exercised 
this authority in non-(b)(3) actions as well. Consider King v. Kansas City 
Southern Industries, Inc., a decision by the Seventh Circuit in a securities 
action alleging violations of federal and state law in the merger of two 
investment advising entities.184 One plaintiff sought to certify a class of 
shareholders under Rule 23(b)(1)(A), arguing that individual actions 
threatened to generate inconsistent adjudications. 185  The district court 
refused the certification request, in part due to concerns over the feasibility 
of notice to the class and manageability of the action, and in part based on 
its conclusion that an alternative method of relief was available that would 
better serve the policies underlying the securities laws.186 The Seventh 
Circuit affirmed, holding that determinations regarding what “procedure 
would further the policies underlying [the substantive law]” were an 
appropriate basis for denying certification and that “[d]etermination of the 
manageability” of a proposed action is “a matter for the trial court’s discre-
tion” in “all class actions,” not just actions brought under subsection 
(b)(3).187 The district court’s decision to refuse a class action in deference to 
a direct action by the injured funds “was a practical decision within its 
discretion,” the appellate court found, and its finding that “a class action 
would not best further the underlying policies” in the dispute fell within the 
proper bounds of its discretion.188 Throughout the opinion, the Seventh 
Circuit based its account of the district court’s discretion on general principles 

868 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (invoking Reiter for the proposition that “district court[s should 
be allowed] full authority to exercise every bit of discretionary power that the law provides”); 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 630 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (suggesting that district courts have broad power to certify class actions under 
Reiter because they are more familiar than the appellate courts with the issues). 
183 511 F.2d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1975). 
184 519 F.2d 20, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1975). 
185 Id. at 25. 
186 See id. (discussing alternative of a direct action by the funds allegedly injured by the merger, 
possibly including intervention by individual shareholders). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 26-27. 
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of certification under Rule 23, rather than the particularities of any subsec-
tion of Rule 23(b).189 
And then there is Judge Posner’s opinion for the Seventh Circuit in In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., a nationwide class action brought against manufac-
turers of blood solid products for failing to guard adequately against the 
transmission of HIV to hemophiliacs.190 After a period characterized by 
increasingly expansive applications of Rule 23 in personal injury and 
products liability cases, Rhone-Poulenc was the first of three cases—along 
with In re American Medical Systems, Inc.191 from the Sixth Circuit and 
Castano v. American Tobacco Co.192 from the Fifth Circuit—that marked a 
significant shift, employing extraordinary forms of review to reject broad 
classes that had been certified by district courts193 and spurring the Civil 
Rules Committee to amend Rule 23 in 1998 by adding a provision for 
immediate appeal of class certification rulings when deemed appropriate by 
the circuit courts.194 
The primary basis that Judge Posner offered for rejecting the district 
court’s certification order through the extraordinary device of mandamus 
intervention related to the immature nature of the tort claim at issue. 
Certification of a nationwide class would have forced the defendants to 
“stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial” in a claim that 
had not yet been tested through “a decentralized process of multiple trials, 
involving different juries, and different standards of liability”—a way of 
proceeding that threatened to impose overwhelming pressure to settle even 
when the defendant is confident on the merits.195 The majority acknowledged 

189 The en banc Third Circuit conducted a similar analysis in one of the early TILA cases. In 
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., the court reversed a district court’s certification of a TILA case and 
recounted the potential for serious adverse consequences to the defendant if notice was issued to 
the class regarding a claim of “doubtful validity.” 496 F.2d 747, 757-58 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc). In 
examining the alternative remedies available to claimants, the court described the role that stare 
decisis and non-mutual offensive issue preclusion might play in empowering cardholders to 
establish liability and found that “it is hardly fair to say that the judicial system must insist on res 
judicata [through class certification] rather than collateral estoppel or stare decisis.” Id. at 760. 
190 51 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (7th Cir. 1995). 
191 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996). 
192 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
193 AMS and Rhone-Poulenc employed mandamus to conduct their review. See AMS, 75 F.3d 
at 1074; Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294. Castano came up by way of a certified interlocutory appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See 84 F.3d at 737. 
194 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f )  (permitting immediate appeal from the grant or denial of class 
certification if accepted by the court of appeals); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f )  advisory committee’s note 
to the 1998 amendments (describing the change). 
195 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299. But see Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 710 & n.57 (2013) (discussing the “blackmail effect” described by Judge 
Posner and noting disagreement about the magnitude of the problem in modern class litigation). 
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“the district judge’s commendable desire to experiment with an innovative 
procedure for streamlining the adjudication of th[e] mass tort,”196 but it 
found that the use of a centralized nationwide class action in an immature 
tort case where claims were capable of being litigated on an individual basis, 
coupled with problems in the definition of the liability standard and the 
disaggregation of common and individual issues, rendered the certification 
order an abuse of discretion even on the extraordinarily deferential stand-
ards of mandamus review.197 
Judge Posner wrote in Rhone-Poulenc as though his analysis was largely 
sui generis, but his opinion is of a piece with the antitrust and securities 
rulings described above: an exercise of judicial discretion declining to certify 
a broad class action on the basis of a conclusion that aggregate litigation 
would undermine important substantive policy values. Rhone-Poulenc is not 
as careful as some of those earlier precedents in identifying the specific 
source of the substantive policies that counsel against class treatment. Judge 
Posner invokes general concerns regarding premature comprehensive 
adjudication of novel liability questions without ascribing those concerns to 
any particular body of state law,198 and the extraordinary posture of manda-
mus review raises important questions about the propriety of the majority’s 
action. But in other respects, Rhone-Poulenc is quite similar to earlier rulings 
that denied class certification to avoid undermining substantive law. As in 
Kansas City Southern Industries, the majority in Rhone-Poulenc operated 
outside the scope of the superiority requirement when it ruled that individ-
ual actions would better serve the tort policies implicated in the case than 
would a broad class proceeding, a mode of analysis that traces back to Ratner 
and the TILA cases.199 And in acknowledging the proper role of experimen-
tation in the aggregate treatment of novel claims along with the necessary 
limits upon such experimentation, the court joined a conversation that 
began in the earliest post-1966 class action rulings and that eventually 
produced such reforms as the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 that eliminated 

196 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1297 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197 Id. at 1304. 
198 See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of 
Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 67-68 (2010) (describing Judge Posner’s assertions about “the 
danger of adjudicating an immature tort in a nationwide class action” as “incomplete”). 
199 The district judge in Rhone-Poulenc had proceeded exclusively on the authority of Rule 
23(c)(4) to certify a class “with respect to particular issues” and the Seventh Circuit never cites or 
discusses the superiority provision in its analysis. 51 F.3d at 1297. Judge Rovner, in dissent, 
criticized the majority for this feature of its analysis, calling instead for a strict account of judicial 
discretion in the certification decision limited to factors expressly authorized by the Rule. Id. at 
1307-08 (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
  
2014] Discretion in Class Certification 1935 
 
conditional certification.200 Judge Posner’s opinion has played a larger role 
than some of those earlier precedents in shaping later discussions about 
substantive law and the discretion not to certify, but it did not originate 
those discussions. 
The discretion not to certify also finds expression in cases where the 
district court’s reasons for skepticism over the propriety of a class proceed-
ing relate to broader litigation dynamics rather than specific substantive 
policies. The Fourth Circuit has offered one of the strongest statements of 
the discretion not to certify in this mode. In Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, 
Inc., the appellate court affirmed the decision of a district court to decertify 
a Title VII pattern and practice claim that alleged racial discrimination 
against African-American workers at the Virginia headquarters of a major 
retailer.201 After initially finding that the requirements of Rule 23 were 
satisfied and certifying the class, the trial court concluded that class treat-
ment of the particular claims before it would be inefficient, unmanageable, 
and cumbersome.202 It also developed concerns that the plaintiffs’ proposal 
to try the question of punitive damages on a classwide basis before conducting 
individual hearings on actual harm, compensatory damages, and employee-
specific defenses could result in an overestimation of the egregiousness of 
defendant’s conduct and hence an excessive damages award.203 Efficiency 
and a fair estimation of damages are not enumerated as specific considera-
tions in Rule 23(b)(2), under which the plaintiffs were proceeding,204 but the 
Fourth Circuit insisted upon the prerogative of district courts to factor such 
concerns into the certification decision nonetheless:  
Rule 23 states that an action “may” be maintained as a class action if the listed 
requirements are met. The Rule does not say that, once the requirements are 
met, the district court “must” certify and maintain the suit as a class ac-
tion. . . . [W]e have previously held that district courts have broad discre-
tion in deciding whether to certify a class. This broad discretion necessarily 

200 See supra Section II.A. 
201 158 F.3d 742, 753-54, 768 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999), aff ’d in pertinent 
part, 206 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2000). 
202 Id. at 753-54. 
203 Id. at 758-59. 
204 The Fourth Circuit noted that such concerns might fairly be comprised within the (b)(3) 
factors relating to superiority and, while disclaiming any intent to import those factors wholesale 
into subsection (b)(2), held “that in appropriate circumstances a district court may exercise its 
discretion to deny certification if the resulting class action would be unmanageable or cumber-
some.” Id. at 758 n.5. 
The use of Rule 23(b)(2) in an action seeking broad punitive and compensatory damages does 
not survive the Court’s decision in Dukes. See 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (holding that claims for 
individualized monetary relief are not appropriate for certification under subsection (b)(2)). 
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implies that the district court may appropriately consider factors other than 
those listed in Rule 23 in determining whether to certify a class ac-
tion. . . . [T]he district court has such broad discretion to certify a class 
because it is intimately familiar with such practical and factual intricacies of 
the suit.205 
I have not discovered a judicial interpretation of the permissive language of 
Rule 23 that more directly calls into question the Court’s apparent treat-
ment of the issue in Shady Grove than this one. The substance of the Lowery 
court’s interpretation, however, represents the dominant sentiment among 
the lower federal courts throughout the post-1966 period. Similarly, lower 
federal courts have regularly claimed discretion to deny certification in cases 
involving uncertainty over the enumerated requirements of Rule 23 when 
their analysis produces indeterminate results and requires the exercise of 
judgment about the workability of a class proceeding. Thus, cases where the 
parameters of a class definition are “inherently nonspecific” and leave doubt 
about the ascertainability of class membership have led courts to claim 
broad discretion in denying class certification—one among many possible 
examples.206 
Litigation against government officials has also produced a line of cases 
that assert a distinct justification for judicial discretion to deny class certifi-
cation despite a complaint’s seeming compliance with the provisions of Rule 
23. In cases involving requests for injunctive relief against government 
defendants, the proposition that a class action might be an unnecessary form 
of relief has been formally adopted by a number of federal circuits as a basis 
for denying class treatment, often under the rubric of a “necessity require-
ment.” The doctrine has its origin in another influential ruling by Judge 
Friendly in Galvan v. Levine, a case involving a New York policy that 
targeted workers of Puerto Rican origin for the denial of unemployment 
benefits.207 A three-judge panel tried the claims of two individual Puerto 
Rican plaintiffs, found the challenged policy unconstitutional, and enjoined 
its further enforcement, a result that the state accepted.208 The panel denied 
the plaintiffs’ request to certify a class on behalf of all similarly affected 

205 Lowery, 158 F.3d at 757-58 (citations omitted). 
206 See Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (denying certification of 
a class purporting to represent employees “who presently reside or desire to reside outside of 
Milwaukee County” in challenging a residency requirement for civil service employment); see also 
7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785 (3d ed. 
2005 & Supp. 2013) (collecting cases regarding determinations whether class actions should be 
certified). 
207 490 F.2d 1255, 1257 (2d Cir. 1973). 
208 Id. at 1260. 
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workers, however, and the plaintiffs appealed from that denial.209 The 
Second Circuit affirmed and suggested that class certification was generally 
unnecessary in cases involving facial constitutional challenges to govern-
ment policies: 
[I]nsofar as the relief sought is prohibitory, an action seeking declaratory or 
injunctive relief against state officials on the ground of unconstitutionality 
of a statute or administrative practice is the archetype of one where class 
action designation is largely a formality, at least for the plain-
tiffs. . . . [W]hat is important in such a case for the plaintiffs or, more 
accurately, for their counsel, is that the judgment run to the benefit not only 
of the named plaintiffs but of all others similarly situated, as the judgment 
did here. The State has made clear that it understands the judgment to bind 
it with respect to all claimants; indeed even before entry of the judgment, it 
withdrew the challenged policy even more fully than the court ultimately 
directed and stated it did not intend to reinstate the policy.210 
A number of other circuits have adopted some version of this necessity 
requirement, but most have emphasized that the doctrine is discretionary—
not automatic—and must be administered with careful attention to the 
enforcement dynamics of particular disputes.211 There have been occasions 
when lower federal courts have denied class treatment in such cases and 
government officials have then failed to come into general compliance after 
losing on the merits, justifying the certification of a broad remedial class in 
subsequent proceedings.212 

209 Id. 
210 Id. at 1261 (citations omitted). 
211 See, e.g., Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1356 (1st Cir. 1985) (recognizing the discretion of 
federal courts to “deny Rule 23(b)(2) certification where it is a formality or otherwise inappropri-
ate” but emphasizing the need for attention to “situations where a class certification under Rule 
23(b)(2) will arguably be unnecessary, but where other considerations may render a denial of 
certification improper”); Duprey v. Conn. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 191 F.R.D. 329, 339 (D. Conn. 
2000) (explaining that “whether to apply the necessity doctrine is a matter committed to the 
sound discretion of the district court” and finding that a defendant’s refusal to concede the 
commonality and typicality of the class claims indicates a likelihood that the defendant will resist 
voluntary compliance militating in favor of class certification if otherwise appropriate). 
212 For example, in Bermudez v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, plaintiffs challenged the federal 
food stamp program’s refusal to provide retroactive adjustments to welfare recipients whose 
benefits were found to have been wrongfully withheld. 490 F.2d 718, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
Earlier suits challenging the same policy had been initiated in other courts, which had denied 
nationwide class treatment on the strength of the assumptions that “the federal government would 
voluntarily rescind the policy” and that “the precedential value of the judgment would make a 
class action unnecessary.” Id. at 724. “Neither of these hopes [was] fulfilled,” so the district court in 
Bermudez determined that class relief had become necessary, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. 
at 724-25. 
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As with many of the cases involving the discretion not to certify, courts 
vary in the textual justifications they offer, if any, for this necessity doctrine. 
Thus, the First Circuit has explained that it “prefer[s] not to speak of a 
‘necessity requirement.’” 213  Instead, it has adopted a reading of Rule 
23(b)(2)’s language requiring injunctive relief that is “appropriate respecting 
the class as a whole”214 to mean that a classwide injunction is not “appropri-
ate” when it appears unnecessary to achieve broad remedial compliance.215 
In contrast, Judge Leon of the D.C. District Court recently disclaimed any 
need for specific textual justification in exercising the discretion not to 
certify in a suit against a government defendant, explaining that “[e]ven 
though the proposed classes satisfy the eligibility criteria in Rule 23, the 
Court may nevertheless deny class certification based on other relevant 
considerations” and may “tak[e] account of factors not expressly delineated 
in Rule 23.”216 The judge found this species of discretion to be particularly 
well-suited for facial constitutional challenges to government policies in 
which the court believes that a single decree will provide relief to all 
affected individuals.217 
Finally, some decisions have recognized discretion not to certify in damages 
actions where the remedial justification for a class action is unclear. One 
early influential case of this type, Kamm v. California City Development Co., 
involved a dispute in which investors claimed fraud by promoters of a real 
estate development scheme.218 By the time the plaintiffs requested class 
certification, California public authorities had already initiated an enforce-
ment proceeding against the developers in which they secured an injunction 
that prohibited further deceptive practices and negotiated a settlement 
requiring the defendants to offer restitution to injured parties.219 Investors 
who chose to reject those offers of restitution could still pursue their claims, 
and the class representatives sought to advance these claims on an aggregate 
basis.220 The district court invoked the superiority requirement to deny the 
request for certification, finding that the alternative remedy available under 
the state settlement rendered it unnecessary to permit parties who rejected 

213 Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1356. 
214 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
215 Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1356. 
216 Mills v. Dist. of Columbia, 266 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2010). 
217 See id. at 22-23 (“[T]he relief sought by the named plaintiffs by virtue of their facial chal-
lenge affords sufficient protection to the proposed class members . . . thereby making class 
certification in this particular context wholly unnecessary.”). 
218 509 F.2d 205, 207 (9th Cir. 1975). 
219 Id. at 207-08. 
220 Id. at 208. 
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the offer of restitution to pursue private remedies on an aggregate basis.221 
The Ninth Circuit found this ruling to be an appropriate exercise of 
discretion, emphasizing the “[s]ignificant relief ” already realized by the 
investors and the likelihood that a class action would “duplicate and possibly 
to some extent negate” the work already undertaken in the state proceed-
ings.222 Kamm continues to be cited in discussions about the propriety of 
class certification of damages claims in the aftermath of regulatory enforce-
ment proceedings.223 
III. ANALYZING THE ROLE OF DISCRETION 
IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 
My primary purpose in this Article is a descriptive one. The topic of 
discretion in class certification has received inadequate attention in the 
scholarly and judicial literature with no systematic account of the types of 
discretion that courts have actually exercised since the 1966 revisions to 
Rule 23. The overview and taxonomy that I set forth above is far from 
complete, but I believe that it provides a framework within which more 
useful analysis can develop. 
My normative goals are more limited. The cases discussed above encom-
pass a broad range of liability policies and litigation contexts, and it would 
require a dedicated and sustained treatment to advance any well-supported 
argument about the proper role of a court’s discretion in any one of them. 
That said, I am convinced that the judicial devices described throughout 
this Article must be available as potential tools in any successful system of 
class litigation. In this Part, I offer some further observations about the 
systemic nature of discretion in class certification: its inevitability in the 
administration of aggregate proceedings, and some of the elements of class 
action doctrine that can serve as counterweights to the exercise of discretion 
by lower federal courts. I also address the impact of Shady Grove on this 
system of discretion—an impact that is considerably more modest than the 
Court’s arresting language in that opinion might first lead one to assume. 

221 Id. at 209. 
222 Id. at 212. 
223 See, e.g., In re Conseco Life Ins. Co. LifeTrend Ins. Sales & Mktg. Litig., 270 F.R.D. 521, 
533 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (distinguishing Kamm in an injunctive class action presenting liability 
theories distinct from those pursued by regulators); Thornton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 
2006 WL 3359482, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2006) (citing Kamm in support of “the proposition 
that state relief coupled with an opportunity to bring individual claims is superior to a class 
action”); see also Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming 
a district court’s denial of class certification in a Title VII action where an earlier consent decree 
offered a no-fault method of relief ) . 
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A. The System of Discretion Surrounding Class Certification 
The forms of discretion explored in the previous Parts reveal several 
unsurprising truths regarding class action litigation. First, there is a signifi-
cant amount of indeterminacy in the certification of class proceedings, and 
there are limitations on the ability of strictly defined rules to resolve this 
indeterminacy.224 Experimentation is inevitable when courts encounter a 
request for class certification in a new type of claim involving new types of 
proof.225 The discretion to limit the definition of a class to a core set of 
claims that are particularly well-suited to aggregate treatment, or to con-
strain the geographic scope of the class so as to limit the impact of certifica-
tion in uncertain terrain, permits courts to develop a body of knowledge and 
practice over time from which they can make more confident decisions 
about certification.226 As the Tenth Circuit observed in Wilcox v. Commerce 
Bank of Kansas City, “it might be comforting to all of us in a way if each 
decision on review could clatter out of a slot brightly and clearly minted 
whenever governing symbols seemed to match, without the necessity of 
pondering over more imponderable but significant indications.”227 But that 
is not how complex cases usually operate. 
Second, the introduction of class certification into a liability scheme can 
produce unforeseen consequences, and the general presumption that 

224 Professor Kim makes a similar observation in her analysis of discretion among lower 
courts, admonishing quantitative analysts to engage with legal doctrine when seeking to measure 
judicial behavior. See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 388 (2007) 
(“Despite the demand of hierarchical precedent, lower federal courts retain a substantial amount 
of discretion when deciding cases. . . . To some extent that discretion exists because it is 
unavoidable—legal language is at some point irredeemably indeterminate.”); see also H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (1961) (arguing that legal rules “will, at some point where 
their application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open 
texture”). 
225 The Fifth Circuit made this point in Castano when explaining its reason for rejecting a 
single nationwide class action for claims that the tobacco industry induced its customers to become 
dependent upon nicotine. See 84 F.3d 734, 749 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The primary procedural difficulty 
created by immature torts is the inherent difficulty a district court will have in determining 
whether the requirements of [R]ule 23 have been met.”). 
Castano’s analysis of these issues can fairly be characterized as hostile toward the claimants. 
Indeed, “jeremiad” would be an apt term to describe the tenor of its analysis. The court seemed 
more interested in foreclosing a nationwide proceeding than in providing guidance for how smaller 
and more discretely defined class proceedings might fall within the proper bounds of a district 
court’s discretion, creating opportunities for experimentation with aggregate treatment of these 
novel claims. 
226 See Friendly, supra note 13, at 771-73 (describing the value of allowing appellate courts to 
develop settled practice over time, and arguing for concomitantly greater appellate constraints on 
district court discretion in such cases). 
227 474 F.2d 336, 348 (10th Cir. 1973). 
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legislatures enact statutes against the backdrop of an existing procedural 
landscape is frequently an inadequate response. Indeed, in light of the 
robust tradition of discretion in class certification reflected in the cases 
discussed herein, such discretion may fairly be characterized as an estab-
lished part of that procedural landscape. In cases where the statutory 
language allows it, the discretion not to certify can operate as a safety valve, 
permitting courts to explore the available avenues for relief in a series of 
cases from which they can determine when class treatment is appropriate 
and, conversely, when broad certification orders threaten to undermine the 
values sought to be promoted by the legislative scheme. As Professor 
Burbank and I have argued: 
The history of Rule 23 . . . entails a seventy-year-long discussion of the 
deeply intertwined relationship between the procedural mechanism that 
enables aggregation of large numbers of claims for adjudication and the 
capacity of that mechanism to ossify certain liability rules (in the case of 
original Rule 23) or to catalyze innovation in the liability policies of the 
underlying law (in the case of the post-1966 version of the Rule, and partic-
ularly Rule 23(b)(3)).228 
Almost fifty years of experience under modern Rule 23 has produced a now-
unavoidable “awareness that in ‘procedure’ lurks power to alter or mask 
substantive results.”229 Discretion in class certification must be sufficiently 
capacious to address those substantive impacts in appropriate cases. Again 
the Tenth Circuit in Wilcox: “[O]ur whole system of justice is importantly 
geared to the balancing of judgment across variant and numerous circum-
stances by judges who must be entrusted[,] from the very difficulties of 
remote comparison and the superior perception of firsthand impression[,] to 
a wide discretion.”230 
Third, the forms of discretion explored in the Sections above are inter-
connected. As Section II.C discusses, the power to control the definition or 
scope of a proposed class—a widely acknowledged and uncontroversial form 
of judicial control—is not qualitatively distinct from the discretion not to 
certify. Judge Friendly argued that the forms of procedural discretion that 
are most directly tied to matters of substantive policy may require the most 
invasive forms of appellate control, at least once the federal courts have 

228 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 198, at 62; see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 
344-45 (1979) (identifying the protection of consumers as a primary purpose of the antitrust laws 
and a guiding principle in the certification of consumer class actions). 
229 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 198, at 30. 
230 474 F.2d at 348. 
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acquired sufficient experience to have confidence in setting forth constraining 
rules.231 But it is not possible to eliminate the more consequential forms of 
discretion in class certification altogether without threatening the pliability, 
and hence the viability, of the entire enterprise. 
There are dangers associated with robust judicial discretion. The type of 
trial court discretion that the Tenth Circuit approved in Shook v. Board of 
County Commissioners of El Paso232 threatens a lack of uniformity in the 
treatment of requests for certification and an appearance of inconsistency in 
the rule of law. Discretion in matters with such immediate substantive 
implications can also turn into a platform for the advancement of policy 
preferences or the expression of judicial hostility toward particular substan-
tive legal regimes. While the legal realist mindset would assume that the 
advancement of judicial preferences is unavoidable, discretion in class 
certification may present more acute dangers on that score.233 And insofar as 
the exercise of discretion aims to develop better information about the 
consequences of class certification in the face of indeterminacy, there is 
reason to question whether courts tend to overestimate their own expertise 
and, relatedly, whether the costs of indeterminacy should be addressed by 
politically accountable actors instead. Professor Bone has developed a 
general critique of procedural discretion along these lines, and while I 

231 See Friendly, supra note 18, at 758 (arguing that “broad appellate constraint is necessary” 
in cases with substantive policy implications “to preserve the most basic principle of jurispru-
dence” that “we must act alike in all cases of like nature”). 
232 543 F.3d 597, 603-04 (10th Cir. 2008) (affirming a district court’s denial of certification in 
an institutional reform case for reasons bearing upon remedial policy and predominance, while 
also acknowledging that “other district courts perhaps could have chosen, or could choose, to 
certify similar classes”). 
233 See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 764 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) (Seitz, 
C.J., dissenting) (“The unarticulated major premise of the majority decision is a distaste for class 
actions, at least in the present context [of a TILA dispute]. I do not believe such distaste, however 
widely shared, justifies judicial emasculation of Rule 23.”); Marcus, supra note 103, at 1606 (“The 
increasing vigor of the federal courts in tailoring the class action and other procedures to handle 
mass tort litigation has done little to disguise the substantive objective.” (footnote omitted)). 
Professor Coffee has argued that trial judges are particularly prone to act from institutional 
self-interest, limiting the rights of parties in service of case management and docket clearing. See 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1343, 1463 (1995) (“[T]he fact of judicial self-interest must be placed at center stage. . . . [T]he 
least acceptable reform proposals are those that simply increase the discretion of the trial judge. 
Given such discretion, the right to opt out would soon wither, and litigant autonomy might 
increasingly become a nostalgic memory.” (footnote omitted)). 
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disagree with his conclusions, the concerns that he identifies require serious 
attention.234 
The alternative, however, is to adopt strictly defined rules that avoid 
unsustainable outcomes in some problematic cases at the cost of foreclosing 
socially useful class actions in others. In Amchem, for example, the Court 
rejected a massive coordinated effort to employ a settlement-only class 
action to address the catastrophe of asbestos personal injury litigation.235 
The majority decision was characterized by strict formalism, demanding 
adherence to prophylactic rules without any allowance for a pragmatic 
assessment of the value of those rules in the actual case. That approach is 
appropriate when reviewing adequacy of representation—a structural 
protection that calls for prophylactic rules designed to guard against 
conflicts of interest. But it was counterproductive when applied to 
predominance—a requirement grounded in pragmatism where the need for 
prophylactic protection is not apparent and the case for a more context-
sensitive exercise of discretion is compelling.236 Similarly, in the early years 

234 See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1961, 2002 (2007) (arguing that trial courts lack the competency to tailor procedures to 
individual cases in a consistently effective manner). 
235 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997) (recognizing that 
although “a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most secure, 
fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure,” the case before the Court 
could not be sustained as a class action). 
236 See Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 46 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1106-07 (2013) (criticizing Amchem for “equating predominance 
with class cohesion and then tying class cohesion to the legitimacy of adjudicative representation” 
and thereby “enlist[ing] predominance to do due process and fairness work as well”); Robert H. 
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 802-07 (2013) (discussing the 
impact of Amchem’s rigid approach to predominance on class settlement practices, which makes 
“courts feel constrained to reject a class settlement because of predominance issues that were 
irrelevant in the settlement context”). 
The Court’s primary justification for a strict enforcement of predominance in the settlement 
context was a concern that class counsel would lack leverage in negotiations and that the court 
would have inadequate information in assessing the fairness of a proposed settlement: 
[I]f a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification, eclipsing Rule 23(a) and 
(b), and permitting class designation despite the impossibility of litigation, both class 
counsel and court would be disarmed. Class counsel confined to settlement negotiations 
could not use the threat of litigation to press for a better offer, and the court would face a 
bargain proffered for its approval without benefit of adversarial investigation. 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 (citations omitted).  
I do not dismiss this concern out of hand, but it was clearly misapplied in the asbestos cases, 
where plaintiff ’s counsel enjoyed significant leverage through the threat to continue litigating 
individual asbestos claims on an inventory basis, as indeed they did after the settlement was 
invalidated. See Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1912-15 (2002) (describing the dynamics of aggregated inventory litigation 
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of the TILA, when lower federal courts were presented with class actions 
that would have imposed crippling liability, sometimes based on minor and 
technical disclosure infractions,237 the discretion to assess the propriety of 
class certification in light of the purposes of the TILA alleviated the intense 
pressure to restrict Rule 23 in more categorical terms in order to avoid 
unsustainable results. The Wilcox court captures this proposition, as well: “It 
would be worse in the long run to maim or kill . . . Rule [23] with univer-
sal but improvident kindness than to limit on a case by case basis within 
sound judicial discretion its application to situations offering sensible 
results.”238 
There are mediating factors in class action doctrine that address some of 
the concerns raised by the discretion to redefine a class or deny certification. 
One systemic counterweight to the impact of the discretion not to certify is 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Bayer Corp.239 Bayer rejected an 
attempt by the defendant in a products liability case to use a federal court 
judgment that had denied certification of a proposed statewide class in West 
Virginia as grounds to enjoin a state court from certifying a class of the 
same claimants asserting the same claims.240 The Court found that differ-
ences in West Virginia’s certification standard meant that the issue resolved 
in the federal judgment was not the same as that presented in the state 
court, rendering the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act 
unavailable,241 and also that the putative class members of the uncertified 
class were never made “parties” to the federal court action and hence were 
not bound by the judgment in any event.242 The Court did not reach the 
question of whether due process would make injunctive enforcement of a 
denial of certification impossible, resting only on the federal common law of 

for asbestos claims). However, unlike the Court in Amchem, I view the impact that an inability to 
certify a litigation class would have upon class settlement negotiations as a matter properly subject 
to judicial discretion rather than a strict prophylactic rule. 
237 The extent to which litigation under the early TILA involved only “technical” violations 
is disputed. See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The 
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 889-90 (2003) (noting that 
“more than half of TILA litigation in [the pre-1989 era] challenged the accuracy of finance charges 
‘not a “technicality,” but one of the two most fundamental disclosures mandated by TIL[A]’” 
(quoting KATHLEEN E. KEEST & GARY KLEIN, TRUTH IN LENDING 36 (3d ed. 1995))). 
238 474 F.2d 336, 349 (10th Cir. 1973); see also Marcus, supra note 103, at 1611 (highlighting 
problems with alternatives to the use of procedural discretion and noting that critics of discretion 
“seem to concede that the systemic changes that have led to the current situation do not admit of 
ready cures”). 
239 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). 
240 Id. at 2382. 
241 Id. at 2377-79. 
242 Id. at 2379-82. 
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preclusion and reserving decision on the power of Congress or the drafters 
of the Federal Rules to expand the scope of that common law doctrine.243 
Bayer erects a barrier that limits the impact of a federal court’s denial of 
certification, preserving the ability of putative class members to initiate a 
new action and to convince another court that certification is in fact war-
ranted. To the extent that the doctrine of discretion suggests room for 
different judgments among lower federal courts in the propriety of class 
certification, Bayer creates space for the exploration of the issue among 
different jurists. The “principles of comity” counseling adherence to prior 
rulings that the Supreme Court anticipated among lower federal courts in 
Bayer244 should operate at their strongest when the initial court determines 
that a proposed action fails to satisfy strict rule-based requirements for 
certification, rendering class treatment wholly inappropriate. Where the 
denial of certification involves the type of judgment that could lead “other 
district courts . . . [to] choose[] to certify similar classes,” as the Tenth 
Circuit explained the issue in Shook,245 then the restraints of comity are 
weaker when the same issue is placed before a subsequent court.246 

243 Id. at 2376 n.7, 2382 n.12. In previous work, I have argued that due process imposes no 
categorical barrier to the enforcement of a federal court’s denial of class certification in subsequent 
cases, and that a prohibitory injunction against serial attempts to secure certification of the same 
class in a new court are constitutionally possible and sometimes warranted. See Tobias Barrington 
Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2035, 2109-17 (2008). I gave little attention in that treatment to the antecedent preclusion 
questions that the Court addressed in Bayer. The significance of that component of the analysis 
was made apparent when the Court provided a comprehensive restatement of the categories and 
limitations on nonparty preclusion under federal common law in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 
(2008). See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.11 cmt. b (2010) 
(citing Wolff, supra, at 2109-17) (discussing the state of the law after the Court’s decision in Taylor). 
The Court’s holding in Bayer and its conservative treatment of the federal common law implica-
tions of the Class Action Fairness Act are both defensible. If Congress were to adopt a compre-
hensive approach to preclusion in federal class action litigation that included the possibility of 
preemptive force for denials of class certification, my earlier analysis would still lead me to 
conclude that due process would impose no categorical barrier. 
Given the decision of the Court in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 
497, 503-04 (2001), which adopted a strained interpretation of Rule 41(b) in order to avoid the 
serious problems that would arise under the Rules Enabling Act if a Federal Rule purported to 
mandate a rule of preclusion, it is surprising that the Bayer Court flags “a change in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure” as one possible response to its holding. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. at 2382 n.12. 
244 See 131 S. Ct. at 2382 (“[W]e would expect federal courts to apply principles of comity to 
each other’s class certification decisions when addressing a common dispute.”). 
245 543 F.3d 597, 603-04 (10th Cir. 2008). 
246 The Third Circuit recognized a similar distinction in an early TILA case, entertaining an 
argument that decisions involving “nondiscretionary reasons for rejecting class action treatment” 
might be proper subjects for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) whereas denials of 
certification that “involve[] the exercise of discretion” would not. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 
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Another systemic counterweight is the ability of a district court to con-
trol the future preclusive effect of a class action judgment upon the ability 
of absentees to pursue related individual claims. District courts have the 
power to impose prospective constraints on the impact of their judgments in 
order to avoid debilitating conflicts of interest among class members arising 
from the risk of adverse preclusion consequences.247 A court presented with 
a class action that otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 can 
employ that power to facilitate certification where doing so is appropriate 
under the preclusion policies governing the dispute.248 The decision not to 
employ that power is, in effect, a discretionary judgment not to certify, 
whereas the decision to impose preclusion constraints to overcome any 
conflicts of interest is the affirmative use of discretion to certify a class. 
Similarly, a court’s discretion to redefine a class may preserve the oppor-
tunity for class members to obtain the benefits of a representative proceeding 
despite the bad choices or skewed incentives of their representatives, as in 
Maneely v. City of Newburgh.249 The power of the court to protect class 
members from adverse preclusion effects helps to preserve the viability of 
that option. 
B. Discretion in Class Certification After Shady Grove 
It remains to ask whether this system of interlocking discretion in class 
certification, developed over half a century and affirmed or acknowledged by 
the Supreme Court on several occasions, was abruptly eliminated by the 
Court’s opinion on the Rules Enabling Act in Shady Grove.250 In rejecting 
the argument that New York CPLR § 901(b) should operate in place of 
Federal Rule 23 when determining the availability of class relief on a 
statutory damages claim, the Court described Rule 23 in terms that appear 
disjunctive with the decades of practice described in the sections above. 
Rule 23 “creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the 

F.2d 747, 752-53 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc). The court ultimately found that the distinction was not 
controlling in a 1292(b) analysis. Id. at 756. 
247 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(b) (1982) (recognizing an ex-
ception to the general prohibition against claim splitting when “[t]he court in the first action has 
expressly reserved the plaintiff ’s right to maintain the second action”); see also In re Vitamin C 
Antitrust Litig., 279 F.R.D. 90, 115-16 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (expressly reserving the right of class 
members to pursue individual damages claims notwithstanding their membership in a class 
seeking injunctive relief ) . 
248 I have explored these issues at some length in earlier work. See generally Tobias Barrington 
Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005). 
249 See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text. 
250 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
  
2014] Discretion in Class Certification 1947 
 
specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action,” the Court asserted—
it “provides a one-size-fits-all formula for deciding the class-action ques-
tion.”251 Responding to Allstate’s argument that Rule 23 does not govern the 
certification question in every case, the majority opined: 
[T]hat is exactly what Rule 23 does: It says that if the prescribed precondi-
tions are satisfied “[a] class action may be maintained” (emphasis added)—
not “a class action may be permitted.” Courts do not maintain actions; litigants 
do. The discretion suggested by Rule 23’s “may” is discretion residing in the 
plaintiff: He may bring his claim in a class action if he wishes. And like the 
rest of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 automatically applies 
“in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts,” 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 699-700 
(1979).252 
Although the Court’s language here is broad and its emphatic tone typo-
graphically unmistakable, its holding addresses a limited question. The 
Court’s citation to Yamasaki in this passage highlights the narrow compass 
of its interpretation of Rule 23. 
The argument that Allstate pursued before the Court, and to which this 
passage responds, asserted that Rule 23 was inapplicable to the certification 
question presented in that case—that class actions were wholly unavailable 
in a suit asserting statutory damages under New York law because Rule 23 
did not govern the question, leaving CPLR § 901(b) to control.253 Reflecting 
the categorical nature of its position, Allstate attempted to rely upon a 
distinction between the criteria for certification and the “antecedent ques-
tion . . . whether the particular type of claim is eligible for class treatment 
in the first place.”254 In this respect, Allstate was advancing an argument 
similar to the primary contention urged by the Social Security Administra-
tion in Yamasaki: that class certification in general, and a nationwide class in 
particular, was categorically unavailable in actions brought to enforce 
certain requirements under the Social Security Act.255 The Yamasaki Court 
rejected those categorical arguments in the portions of its opinion referenced 

251 Id. at 1437. 
252 Id. at 1438 (parallel citation omitted). 
253 See Brief for Respondent at 10-12, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (No. 08-1008) (arguing that CPLR § 901(b) “categorically precludes class 
actions” and should apply in a federal diversity case). 
254 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438. 
255 See 442 U.S. at 698 (noting the Social Security Administration’s argument that class 
actions should be completely precluded under the relevant statute). 
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in the passage from Shady Grove quoted above.256 However, as discussed in 
Section II.C, the Yamasaki Court then proceeded to reaffirm the discretion 
of federal courts to determine whether a nationwide class is appropriate in a 
given case, taking into account the remedial needs of the plaintiffs, the 
burdens that a nationwide class might impose upon the defendant, and the 
broader systemic impact of a class action in light of other remedial proceed-
ings already underway.257 
The Court’s assertion in Shady Grove that “[t]he discretion suggested by 
Rule 23’s ‘may’ is discretion residing in the plaintiff” coupled with its 
references to the “automatic” and “one-size-fits-all” character of the rule are 
undeniably jarring.258 But those assertions respond to an argument about 
the categorical inapplicability of Rule 23. They do not address the proper 
application of the Rule in a given case. The Court’s rejection of the categor-
ical argument in Yamasaki did not render a nationwide class automatically 
available to any plaintiff who could show that the express requirements of 
the Rule were satisfied. And the Reiter Court’s rejection of any categorical 
prohibition on consumer antitrust class actions was accompanied by a strong 
affirmation of the “broad power and discretion” vested in district courts 
“with respect to matters involving the certification and management of 
potentially cumbersome or frivolous class actions.”259 Shady Grove’s holding, 
too, addresses only a narrow categorical question. 
This more limited reading of Shady Grove’s treatment of Rule 23(b) 
seems compelled by the position adopted in dissent by then-Judge Scalia in 
Fink v. National Savings & Trust Co. As discussed above, Judge Scalia 
insisted “that the District Court has broad discretion in determining 
whether a suit should proceed as a class action,” going so far as to adopt a 
rational-basis mode of analysis that would uphold a district court’s discre-
tionary denial of certification even in the absence of specified reasons so 
long as some proper basis for doing so could be discerned from the rec-
ord.260 To read Shady Grove as foreclosing all discretion in the decision to 

256 See id. at 700 (refusing to recognize that class relief under Rule 23 is unavailable without 
“clear expression of congressional intent to exempt [the] actions”). 
257 See id. at 702 (“[A] federal court when asked to certify a nationwide class should take care 
to ensure that the nationwide relief is indeed appropriate in the case before it, and that certifica-
tion of such a class would not improperly interfere with the litigation of similar issues in other 
judicial districts.”). 
258 130 S. Ct. at 1437-38. 
259 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979). 
260 Fink v. Nat’l Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
  
2014] Discretion in Class Certification 1949 
 
certify would ascribe a fatal inconsistency to Justice Scalia’s treatment of the 
issue. 
The limited scope of the Court’s holding in Shady Grove is further illus-
trated by the position adopted by Justice Stevens in concurrence and the 
four dissenters led by Justice Ginsburg, who together formed a majority. All 
five embrace the proposition that Rule 23 (and any Federal Rule) must be 
applied with sensitivity to the impact the Rule might have upon the sub-
stantive policies of the applicable state law in a given case.261 Their disa-
greement, and hence the result in the case, centered on the proper 
interpretation of CPLR § 901(b), which Justice Stevens did not believe to 
be a part of the liability policy of New York.262 
As Professor Burbank and I have argued, there is much to criticize about 
this style of analysis, which invites non-uniform interpretations of the 
Federal Rules and threatens to elevate state substantive law over federal 
substantive law in the Rules Enabling Act hierarchy. The better interpreta-
tion would recognize the limited ability of Rule 23 to set substantive 
aggregate-liability policy in any case, requiring that courts applying the Rule 
always “look to the substantive liability and regulatory regimes of state and 
federal law in determining whether aggregate relief is appropriate and 
consistent with the goals of that underlying law.”263 Many lower federal 
courts have done exactly that.  
That difference aside, however, a clear majority of the Justices in Shady 
Grove did conclude that federal courts must make judgments about the 
propriety of class certification in light of the impact that certification would 
have upon the underlying substantive law. Thus, despite its broad language, 
the majority portion of Shady Grove’s lead opinion must be understood as 
addressing only a Rules Enabling Act question: Rule 23’s applicability in the 
face of contrary state procedural authority, which is what Justice Stevens 
understood CPLR § 901(b) to constitute.264 

261 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1451 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (“I thus agree with Justice Ginsburg that a federal rule, like any federal law, must be 
interpreted in light of many different considerations, including ‘sensitivity to important state 
interests’ and ‘regulatory policies.’” (citations omitted)). 
262 See id. (“I disagree with Justice Ginsburg, however, about the degree to which the mean-
ing of federal rules may be contorted, absent congressional authority to do so, to accommodate 
state policy goals.”); id. at 1465 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding no need to apply Rule 23 
because the New York state statute was directed to achieving a substantive result with regard to 
liability). 
263 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 198, at 21. 
264 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (concluding that CPLR § 901(b) is procedural and not “sufficiently interwoven with the 
scope of a substantive right or remedy” to present a Rules Enabling Act problem). 
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Many lower federal courts discussing the propriety and bounds of class 
certification in light of discretionary factors, particularly those touching on 
matters of liability or regulatory policy, have located their analysis in the 
superiority requirement when an action for damages is proposed under 
subsection (b)(3), or in the general standards of equitable relief and the 
proposition that injunctive relief should be “appropriate” when a plaintiff 
files under subsection (b)(2). No part of the Court’s opinion in Shady Grove 
addresses those features of Rule 23. Although it is true that the Court built 
up a head of rhetorical steam in rejecting Allstate’s categorical argument 
under the Rules Enabling Act, it would be a mistake to read the opinion as 
speaking in any way to the administration of these provisions of the Rule. 
Other courts exercising discretion in class certification, in contrast, have 
treated this power as inherent in the Rule 23 inquiry—as indeed the Court 
itself did in Yamasaki and Reiter—rather than tying discretion to particular 
provisions of the Rule. In some instances, courts have pointed to the “may 
be maintained” language of Rule 23(b) as evidence of that inherent 
discretion.265 This was an unremarkable proposition before Shady Grove 
introduced confusion about the significance of that language. For the time 
being, at least, there is room for debate about the status of extra-textual 
discretion under Rule 23, and federal courts would be well-advised to 
provide specific textual grounding when a proposed class action requires the 
exercise of judgment.266 For example, a ruling on the scope of class certifica-
tion in an immature tort case, as in Rhone-Poulenc, might require a court to 
provide more specific justification under the superiority requirement of 
section (b)(3), as the Fifth Circuit did in Castano.267 
In the years since the Court decided Shady Grove, the lower federal 
courts have treated the case almost exclusively as a Rules Enabling Act 
decision and have given it little attention in the class certification analysis. 
That response is appropriate. It would be preferable for the Court to clarify 
the limited scope of its ruling, and better still for it to issue a mea culpa for 

265 See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 47 (N.D. Cal. 1977) 
(“[T]he Court regards any order at this stage as nothing more than a tentative determination for 
procedural purposes that the action may be maintained as a class action on behalf of a defined 
class.”). 
266 See, e.g., In re TWL Corp., 712 F.3d 886, 894-95 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting language from 
Shady Grove describing Rule 23 as creating “a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff . . . to pursue 
his claim as a class action” but also reaffirming that a district court has discretion in determining 
whether the superiority requirement is satisfied). 
267 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[A]t this time, 
while the tort [of inducing nicotine-dependence] is immature, the class complaint must be 
dismissed, as class certification cannot be found to be a superior method of adjudication.”); id. at 
746-51 (undertaking an extended superiority analysis). 
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its loose treatment of the language of Rule 23(b). In the interim, however, 
there is no cause for lower federal courts to make significant changes to 
their certification practice under Rule 23 outside of the specific Rules 
Enabling Act issue that Shady Grove addressed. 
CONCLUSION 
In his book How Judges Think, Judge Posner makes a trenchant case for 
pragmatism in the administration of complex legal questions. “The core of 
legal pragmatism,” he writes, “is pragmatic adjudication, and its core is 
heightened judicial concern for consequences and thus a disposition to base 
policy judgments on them rather than on conceptualisms and generali-
ties.”268 In response to the objection that pragmatic analysis leads to “ad hoc 
adjudication, in the sense of having regard only for the consequences to the 
parties to the immediate case,” Judge Posner insists that “sensible legal 
pragmatism tells the judge to consider systemic, including institutional, 
consequences as well as consequences of the decision in the case at hand.”269  
The drafters of modern Rule 23 understood that they were placing a tool 
in the hands of the judiciary that would give rise to significant changes in 
civil litigation, the legal profession, and the content of the underlying law 
itself. As Professor Kaplan wrote, “[n]ew [R]ule 23 alters the pattern of class 
actions; subdivision (b)(3), in particular, is a new category deliberately 
created.”270 The effects of such a paradigm shift were unpredictable at the 
inception, and the ongoing adjustments necessary to maintain a workable 
system of class adjudication have never lent themselves easily to specifica-
tion within the text of the Rule. Rather, lower federal courts have pursued a 
course of sensible legal pragmatism of the type that Judge Posner 
endorsed—including, in appropriate cases, “sustaining the authority of the 
trial court to employ realism and good sense in denying class action sta-
tus”271 where doing so is most faithful to the underlying substantive law. 
The point of recognizing discretion in class certification is not to restrict 
the class action as a tool for the private enforcement of public norms. To the 
contrary, the point is to preserve it. If the class action is to retain its vitality, 
then the federal judiciary must remember its own history. Lower federal 
courts have employed a range of tools to authorize class treatment as a 
means of carrying into effect important statutory and constitutional policies 
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while employing their discretion to prevent class certification from producing 
counterproductive and unsustainable results. The Supreme Court exhibited 
an unfortunate tone deafness to that doctrinal symphony when choosing 
some of the language with which it responded to the Rules Enabling Act 
question placed before it in Shady Grove. There is reason to believe, however, 
that any appearance of an anomaly will be short-lived. 
